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IMMIGRANT VICTIMS, IMMIGRANT ACCUSERS
Michael Kagan*

The U visa program provides immigration status to noncitizen victims of crime,
ensuring unauthorized immigrants do not become easy prey because they are too
afraid to seek help from the police. But under the federal government's structuring
of the U visa program, a victim must also become an accuser to receive immigration
benefits. Thus, the U visa implicates the rights of thirdparties: accused defendants.
These defendants are often immigrants themselves who may be deported when U
visa recipients level their accusations. Recent state court decisions have created
complications in the program by permitting defendants to cross-examine accusers
about their desire to obtain immigrationbenefits in exchangefor testimony. Defendants in these cases, often male immigrants, have good reason to aggressively crossexamine their accusers in order to combat a system that perceives men of color as
violent perpetrators and immigrant women as victims in need of protection. Because of these developments, immigrant victims face new obstacles when seeking
law enforcement protection and justice through criminalprosecution. The solution
to these emergingproblems is to separatethe role of victim from the role of accuseras
much as possible. This Article suggests several models that might accomplish this
goal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Victims of gender-based violence face many obstacles when they

seek justice; chief among them is simply being believed. For immigrant victims, this struggle may be becoming even more daunting.
An immigration program set up explicitly to help crime victims may
paradoxically decrease immigrant victims' credibility. In fact, this
program may allow defense attorneys to attack victims by suggesting
that they are testifying simply to obtain immigration benefits.
This emerging challenge stems from the U visa program. The U
visa program provides up to 10,000 visas per year to otherwise unau-

thorized immigrants who are victims of certain-mainly violentcrimes in the United States. To obtain a U visa, a victim must serve
as a helpful witness while law enforcement investigates and prosecutes the relevant crimes.' Congress established this program to
address the concern that unauthorized immigrants who are victims
2
of crime might decline police assistance for fear of being deported.
Although Congress established the program in 2000, implementing
regulations were not issued until late 2007." The 10,000 visa quota
1.

See discussion inia Part III.

2.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
3.
See Elizabeth M. McCormick, Rethinking Indirect Victim ElibilityJr UNon-Immigration
Visas to Better Protect ImmigrantFamilies and Communities, 22 STAN. L. & POL'y R'v. 587, 604-08

(2011).
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quickly proved inadequate to assist the number of eligible applicants. Unfortunately, efforts to expand the quota sit stagnate along
with the larger debate in Congress over comprehensive immigration reform.
Recent developments reveal yet a deeper problem, which is built
into the structure of the U visa program. Although criminal defendants may not necessarily cross-examine witnesses generally about
their immigration status, the Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial
Court held recently that a defendant in a rape trial could impeach
his accuser by suggesting the victim fabricated the assault to get a U
visa. 4 The federal government made this defense argument considerably stronger because of how it structured the U visa. First,
Congress required that U visa recipients be helpful to police and
prosecutors. Second, the statute also requires that visa applicants
secure a certification from law enforcement, giving local police and
prosecutors leverage over immigrants who might be witnesses for
the prosecution. 5 In other words, the U visa established a quid pro
quo system in which unauthorized immigrants face considerable
pressure to trade testimony in order to remain in the United States.
Even if a victim does not exchange testimony for a U visa, the
program creates the perception that immigrants exaggerate crimes
in order to stay in the country. 6 The U visa is part of a special category of immigration programs in which the right to stay in the
country depends on victimhood instead of family, employment, or
business connections. 7 Some of these victim-based programs, such
as asylum and protection under the Convention against Torture,
focus on refugees fleeing persecution in other countries.8 Others,
like the T visa program for victims of trafficking and certain provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), confer visas to
immigrants based on victimization inside the United States.9 These
programs create a danger that applicants might fabricate their victimhood. Normally, the solution to this problem is rigorous scrutiny
and adjudication. But the programs raise concerns that false applications may slip through.
4.
Commonwealth v. Sealy, 6 N.E.3d 1052, 1058 (Mass. 2014), discussed infra at note
189.
5.
See discussion infra Part III.
6.
See discussion infra Parts V.A-B.
7.
Seegenerally DEnoRAii E. ANKER, LAW OFAYLUM IN THE UNITFD STATES § 1:12-16 (7th
ed. 2014) (describing immigration programs in addition to asylum that are based on past or
future harm suffered either inside or outside the United States).
8.
Id. at § 1.12. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (defining refugees); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18 (defining eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture).
9.
See discussion infra Parts II.B (VAWA), VI.C (T visa).
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The U visa worsens the perception that immigrant victims may
fabricate or exaggerate crime reports by forcing victims also to be
accusers. It is not enough for a U visa applicant to claim to be a
victim of violence or abuse."' He or she must formally accuse another person of a crime, likely leading that person to be
prosecuted." The goal of the U visa program should be to put
noncitizen immigrant victims in a roughly equal position as citizen
victims, so that immigrant victims can go to the police for help like
anyone else. But the U visa goes to the opposite extreme. It compels immigrant victims to assist police and prosecutors in a way that
other victims are not compelled to do.
The American criminal justice system must strike a delicate balance between a desire to protect victims and the guarantee for a
fair trial. Striking this balance can be difficult in the best of circumstances. The U visa unnecessarily increases this difficulty, creating
an extra risk of prejudice to defendants and an additional hardship
for victims seeking justice, since defendants are entitled to crossexamine prosecution witnesses. The result is likely to be bad for
both sides. Knowing that witnesses will face tough cross-examination, police and prosecutors may be more wary about whether
immigrant victims will be perceived as credible. Prosecutors may offer more lenient plea bargains or not bring charges at all. If
prosecutions do go to trial, an immigrant victim will likely endure
an especially rough time in the witness chair. Meanwhile, defendants have good reason to aggressively cross-examine their accusers,
both to respond to criminal charges and to fight back against the
racial and gender dynamics involved in many prosecutions. U visa
cases often involve a woman accusing a man of violent abuse because many of the qualifying crimes for a U visa have a significant
gender dimension.' 2 When the victim of a crime is an immigrant,
the perpetrator is often also an immigrant, especially in the domestic violence context. 1 3 Thus, accused defendants, who are often
men of color, face the stereotype that men of color are violent
predators.
This Article identifies some of the difficulties that result from the
structure of the U visa program, paying particular attention to the
problems created by forcing beneficiaries to be both a victim and
an accuser. Part II explains why an immigration program to protect
victims of crime is absolutely essential and Part III sets out how the
10.

See discussion infra at Part III.

11.
12.

Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.

13.

See

INTFt.ATrIONAL ASSOcAirION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, infra

note 27, at 28.
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U visa actually works. Part IV explores the gender dynamics evident
in the structure of the U visa, while Part V analyzes some of the U
visa's built-in problems, starting with the quota and extending to
the way the program interacts with fair trial rights in criminal cases.
Part VI proposes solutions to these problems. The difficulties
with mixing the victim and accuser roles are in fact not new, and
models already exist that could help solve the U visa program's
problems. One approach creates special evidentiary rules that limit
the leverage that prosecutors can hold over witnesses who might
otherwise retract or change their testimony.' 4 Another useful example derives from the American asylum system, which underwent
reforms in the 1990s to separate the accuser and victim roles of
refugees. 5 Additionally, the T visa program for victims of trafficking offers a useful model because applicants depend less on law
enforcement assistance to secure a visa, reducing the danger that
genuine victims will lose credibility for seeking immigration benefits.' 6 This Article concludes that the role of victim must be

disentangled from the role of accuser in order for the U visa program to achieve its goals of aiding law enforcement and protecting
victims.

II.

WHY IMMIGRANT CRIME VICTIMS NEED A VISA

A. Protection of the Law for People Outside the Law

Any country that establishes a legal means of regulating the entry
and presence of non-citizens confronts a series of dilemmas when
unauthorized immigrants are present in violation of the law. As
long as an unauthorized immigrant remains in the country, questions arise about the relationship between the immigrant and the
state. More vividly than perhaps any other group, unauthorized immigrants invoke Hannah Arendt's challenge that liberal
democracies do not always recognize the basic right to have rights
for non-citizens.' 7 Presumably, one consequence of being unauthorized is that a person is entitled to less from the state than a citizen
or an authorized immigrant. But they are still entitled to something, simply by virtue of being human. If basic rights depend on
legal status, then Arendt's critique will apply: "It seems that a man
14.
15.
16.
17.

See discussion infra Part VI.A.
See discussion infra Part VI.B.
See discussion infra Part VI.C.
HANNAH ARENDT, Ti-iF ORIGINS OF ToTAIITARIANISM 299-300 (Meridian Books 1958).
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who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it
possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man."' I
In theory, the law acknowledges that some rights flow simply
from being human. In international law, governments are required
to recognize "everyone .

.

. as a person before the law."' 9 In the

United States, the 14th Amendment requires a state to provide
"equal protection of the laws" to "any person within its jurisdiction." 20 Based on this guarantee of equal protection, the Supreme
Court found that unauthorized immigrant children may not be excluded from primary education. The Court raised the alarm about
"a substantial 'shadow population' of illegal migrants."'2' Three decades ago in Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan wrote:
This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain
here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the
benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful
residents. The existence of such an underclass presents most
difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence
2
to principles of equality under law. 2
Another human right that applies regardless of immigration status is access to law enforcement and police-put another way, the
right to be protected from crime. 23 This principle, the focus of this
Article, is not especially difficult or controversial. Unauthorized immigrants should not be assaulted, robbed, raped, or otherwise
targeted for crime. If they are, police and prosecutors should investigate, arrest, and prosecute the perpetrators. A victim's
18.
Id. at 299-300.
19.
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 16, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, entered inlofiffrce Mar. 23, 1976.

20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See al.ho Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)
("Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary
sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long
been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
21.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 (1982).
22.
Id. at 218-219.
23.
See United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, art. 1, 5, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14)
at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (States may not engage in discrimination
based on "descent, or national or ethnic origin" with regard to "the right to equal treatment
before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice [and] The right to security of
person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by
government officials or by any individual group or institution.").
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immigration status has no bearing on the definitions of common
24
crimes, especially violent crimes.
Putting this concept into practice proves difficult, however. If an
unauthorized immigrant tells a police officer that he has been
mugged at knifepoint, the officer might reasonably believe that two
violations of the law have been reported to him. First, there has
been an armed robbery. Second, the officer has been made aware
of an immigrant who is present in the United States illegally. Immigrants will be hesitant to report robberies if they fear that a police
officer might form this opinion. Human Rights Watch has criticized
cooperation between local law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement for creating exactly this situation, arguing that
immigrants are "afraid to call 911."25 Echoing this concern, a Vir-

ginia police detective wrote that "the fear of deportation has
26
created a class of silent victims."

B. Immigration Law as a Threat to Public Safety

According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(LACP), "immigrant populations are extremely vulnerable to
crime. " 27 Among other challenges, law enforcement organizations
are concerned that "[i]mmigrant women may be less likely to report abuse than nonimmigrant women due to .

. a fear of

deportation if they are not legally documented to live within the
United States. '28 The dynamics of this fear are complicated because
immigrant communities are not homogenous. As the IACP notes:

This is not to suggest that, but for immigration concerns, law enforcement impacts
24.
people equally regardless of race or other immutable identity. See generally MICHELILE ALEXANDER, THlE NEW JIM CROW (2010).
US: Immigrants 'Afraid to Call 911,' HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 15, 2014), http://
25.
www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/14/us-immigrants-afraid-call-911 (criticizing the Secure Communities program); see also Cultivating Fear, HUMAN RIGHS WATCH (May 16, 2012), http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2012/05/ 15/cultivating-fear (describing vulnerability of immigrant
farm workers to sexual assault).
26.

Stacey Ivie and Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa: An Effertive Rsource for Law Enforcement,

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLEITIN 10, 10 (October 2009).
27.
INTERNATIONAl. ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATIION ISSUES 28 (2007), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/O/pdfs/Publicadons/PoliceChiefs
Guidetolmmigration.pdf.
28.
Id. at 28.
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Many immigrant families are a combination of documented
and undocumented individuals, which may account for a reluctance to report a crime if a victim/witness believes it may
29
lead to a family member's deportation.
Another layer of complexity stems from the fact that "these crimes
occur more often by immigrant perpetrators against their own than
3' 1
U.S.-born perpetrators." '

In the 1990s, immigrant advocates and government officials devoted considerable effort to address violence against women in the
context of immigration law. 31 Part of these efforts concerned the

availability of asylum and refugee protection for women who fled
gender-related persecution in other countries.3 2 But immigrant
women in the United States also faced unique problems protecting
themselves from domestic violence. As one advocate said in 1996:
Fear of deportation deters abused immigrant women from
coming forward to report abuse. Just as with abuse victims who
are not immigrants, batterers threaten that they will take custody of minor children. For immigrant women, that threat is
all the more frightening when they are unfamiliar with the
U.S. justice system, may not speak English and fear they will
never see their children again if separated from them through
33
deportation.
Immigrant women's fears were founded in law and history, for
two primary reasons.3 4 First, family-based immigration to the U.S. is
normally based on a system of sponsorship whereby a U.S. citizen or
legal permanent resident applies for his relatives (such as a spouse)
to immigrate.35 Under this system, immigration law does not grant a
right directly to the dependent immigrant who would gain a visa
29.

Id.

30.
31.

Id.
See generally Beth Lubetkin, Violence Against Women and the U.S. Immigration Laws, 90

Am. Socy Irr'i, L. PROC. 616 (1996).
32. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service, Memorandum on Considerations
for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women [Gender Guidelines], May 26,
1995.
33. Lubetkin, supra note 31, at 620 (statement by Mintsiu Chung).
34. For a lucid discussion of the history of immigration law fostering family violence see
Leslye E. Orloff and Janice V. Kaguyutan, Offering a Helping Hand: Legal Protectionfor Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. Po"'y & L. 95, 100-106

(2002).
35. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 (2015) (describing who can petition for family-based
immigration); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2015) (preference categories for family sponsorship); 8
U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2) (2015) (defining immediate relatives).
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through the process; rather the immigration beneficiary is dependent on a petitioner with a more secure status.3 6 Moreover,

marriage-based visas are conditional on a couple remaining married for two years.37 This system puts a great deal of power in the
hands of an abusive spouse, since his victim depends on him to
avoid deportation. 38 Congress addressed this problem in 1994
through the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which allows
individuals to self-petition rather than depend on an abusive spouse
39
to secure legal residence.
Second, any immigrant unlawfully present in the United States
faces a genuine danger of deportation if he or she comes to the
attention of federal authorities. VAWA's self-petition mechanism
only helps immigrants with spouses who have legal status but are
abusive and therefore undesirable sponsors. 4° An unauthorized immigrant, who is married to another unauthorized immigrant,
cannot benefit from this law, even in the case of domestic violence. 4' Despite progress with VAWA, any unauthorized immigrant
who is the victim of any kind of crime still has reason to hesitate to
draw law enforcement attention.
When Congress enacted VAWA in 1994, it also created the S visa
to provide a legal status and potential permanent residency for material witnesses in criminal investigations. 42 Arguably, material
witnesses include crime victims; therefore, the S visa provides a partial solution for unauthorized immigrants who need police
protection. But material witness statutes serve primarily the interests of law enforcement and do not focus on assisting crime
victims. 43 Witness statutes permit arrest, detention, and bond to
36.

See generally Laura Carothers Graham, Relieffor Battered Immigrants Under the Violence

Against Women Act, 10 DEL. L. REv. 263 (2008) (describing how, pre-VAWA, "the effects of
domestic violence on immigrant victims are intensified.").
37.
See8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(B) (2015).
38.
See Lubetkin, supra note 31, at 620 (statement by Mintsiu Chung). See also Deanna
Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A Comparison of Immigrant Protections
Under VAWA 1 & 11, 17 BERKEI. Y WOMEN'S L. J. 137 (2002) (summarizing improvements to

the VAWA system enacted by Congress in 2000).
39. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title IV, Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40701, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). See also Sabrina
Balgamwalla, Bride and Prejudice: How U.S. ImmigrationLaw DiscriminatedAgainst Spousal Visa
Holders, 29 BERKLEYJ. GENDER L. & JusT.. 25, 35-37, 56 (2014) (describing discrimination

against spouses that remains in immigration law post-VAWA).
40.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2015).
41.
Id. (defining eligibility for VAWA self-petitions).
42.
See generally Christina M. Ceballos, Adjustment of Statusfor Alien Material Witnesses: Is It
Coming Three Years Too Late?, 54 U. MIAMI L. Ray-v. 75 (1999).

43.
Id. at 82 (stating that the primary concern of the S visa statute is securing the presence of a material witness in a criminal proceeding).
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compel witnesses to testify. 44 Moreover, the S visa program requires

that the immigrant possess reliable information about a criminal
enterprise, 45 which is information a victim may not have. Although
the S visa program fails to assist crime victims who do not know
much about perpetrators, the program paradoxically can benefit a
criminal or co-conspirator who possesses knowledge about the
crime and serves as a material witness for the state. The S visa also
requires the person's continued presence in the United States for
the criminal investigation or prosecution. 46 If the prosecution has
many witnesses available or if the case is closed through a plea bargain this criteria might not be met, leaving immigrant victims
without assistance.
The limitations of the S visa became evident in two high profile
criminal cases involving large numbers of unauthorized immigrants
in the late 1990s. 47 In Florida in 1998, two teenagers escaped from a

sex slavery ring that lured Mexican girls to work in a network of
brothels around the state. 48 But as the case prepared to go to trial,
the young women remained in immigration limbo, without an S
visa approved, as they prepared to testify.49 Even these highly sympathetic crime victims remained unlawfully present in the United
States and thus subject to the possibility detention and deportation.
In 1997 in New York City, police uncovered an organized criminal
enterprise that forced dozens of deaf and mute Mexican immigrants to essentially beg on the city's subways, subjecting them to
beatings, starvation and electric shocks if they failed to bring in
enough money. 5" After police broke up the ring, immigration authorities detained the victims and their children for nearly a year
51
because they had entered the United States illegally.
The contrast between VAWA and the S visa programs highlights a
tension that remains at the heart of newer immigration provisions
that aim to benefit victims of crime and human trafficking. VAWA is
victim-centered: it requires the applicant be a victim of abuse, but
does not require that his or her presence in the United States benefit law enforcement. 52 Conversely, the S visa is law enforcement
44.
See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 620.30 (McKinney) (describing material witness orders); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/-3(d) (bonds for material witnesses).
45.
Ceballos, supra note 42, at 83.
46.
Id.
47.
Both cases are profiled in Ceballos, supra note 42, at 77-80.
48.
Id. at 77-79.
49.
Id. at 79.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 79-80.
52.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(6)(ii) (2015) (establishing eligibility for undocumented immigrants to petition for classification as a VAWA self-petitioner or based on being subject to
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centered because it grants immigration status only when the applicant can assist police and prosecutors.

III. How THE U VISA WORKS
In 2000, Congress passed the Battered Women Protection Act,
which created the new U visa system to address the concern that
unauthorized immigrants will not cooperate with law enforcement
unless they are shielded from deportation. 53 Unlike VAWA, the U
visa was designed for victims who were not married to U.S. citizens
or legal permanent residents. 54 The Act's name and purpose highlighted particular concerns about gender-based violence, but it
55
actually created a broader program.
U visas may normally be granted for up to four years.5 6 But U visa
holders may apply to adjust to legal permanent residence after
three years of continuous physical presence, if the person's "continued presence in the United States is justified on humanitarian
grounds, to ensure family unity, or is otherwise in the public interest. '57 Permanent residents may eventually apply to naturalize. 5
Thus, in the rhetoric of immigration reform debates, the U visa represents a potential path to citizenship for a person who otherwise
would be unlawfully present in the United States.
For a person who would otherwise be unlawfully present in the
United States, the opportunity to acquire a green card is just one
advantage of the U visa. The U visa's benefits also extend to the
victim's immediate family, principally their spouse and minor children. 59 A successful U visa application can cancel an order of
removal (in layman's terms, deportation). 60 A U visa can also benefit people who have already been deported, because U visas may be
"extreme cruelty"); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(iv) (2015) (establishing eligibility for documented immigrants to petition for classification as a VAWA self-petitioner).
53.
Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1518 Sec. 1502(a) (2000) (included in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000)).
54.
See Kwong, supra note 38, at 149-50. See (avo 114 Stat. 1518 Sec. 1502(a) (2000)
([Congress finds that] "there are several groups of battered immigrant women and children
who do not have access to the immigration protections of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 ....").

55.
Like most U.S. immigrant visas, the U visa name derives from the section of the
Immigration of Nationality Act that defines it: INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(U) (2000).
56.
8 C.F.R. § 214. 14(g) (2015).
57.
8 U.S.C. § 1255(m) (2015).
58.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2015).
59.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a) (10) (2007).
60.
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(i).
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granted to petitioners who are outside the country if they were victims of crime while they were previously in the U.S. 61 Normally, a
noncitizen who had been deported would be barred from reentering the country for ten or twenty years, depending on how many
2
times he or she had been deported.
The U visa's requirements combine the twin goals of helping victims while also aiding law enforcement. 63 On the victim side, visas
are available to victims of a list of specific crimes:
" Abduction
" Abusive Sexual Contact
" Blackmail
" Domestic Violence
" Extortion
" False Imprisonment
" Genital Female Mutilation
" Felonious Assault
" Hostage
" Incest
" Involuntary Servitude
" Kidnapping Manslaughter
* Murder
" Obstruction of Justice
" Peonage
" Peijury
* Prostitution
" Rape
" Sexual Assault
" Sexual Exploitation
* Slave Trader
" Torture
" Trafficking
* Witness Tampering
61.

See8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(5) (i) (B).

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2015).
See Leticia M. Saucedo, A New "U": OrganizingVictims and ProtectingImmigrant Wmkers,
63.
42 U. Ricii. L. Rrv. 891, 907-909 (2008) (describing the U visa's dual purposes).
62.
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64
* Unlawful Criminal Restraint

This list represents either Congress's conception about the
crimes to which immigrants are most vulnerable or the kinds of
crimes that render immigrant victims deserving of a visa. The U visa
list differs significantly from immigration law's standard category of
serious crime: the "aggravated felony.' 65 Aggravated felonies include home invasion burglaries, felony thefts, and a generic
definition of "crimes of violence." 66 Conviction of a crime in this
67
category normally makes a legal permanent resident deportable.
Congress could have written the U visa statute to reference this wellestablished category but opted to generate a new one. Although the
U visa list mostly consists of serious violent crimes, it includes some
that are potentially non-violent and might be prosecuted as misdemeanors, such as prostitution and domestic violence. Crimes such
as peonage and slave trading may potentially be used to obtain U
visas for victims of workplace exploitation, but it is unclear how
68
often this has actually been done.
By requiring that U visa beneficiaries have "suffered substantial
physical or mental abuse," Congress indicated its intent not to grant
visas to all crime victims. 69 Although the U visa can be available to
the victims of some crimes that criminal law normally does not consider felonies, these victims must show that the crime nevertheless
constituted "substantial physical or mental abuse."' 70 However, this
can be shown through "[a] series of acts taken together . . .even
'7
where no single act alone rises to that level." '
On the law enforcement side, a noncitizen may receive a U visa
only if he or she "possesses information concerning criminal activity" and "has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful
to [federal, state, or local authorities] investigating or prosecuting
criminal activity."7 2 This means that the victims must know "specific
facts" about the crime, and must not refuse to provide information
'7 3
to law enforcement when "reasonably requested. "
64.

8 U.S.C.

§

1101(a)(15)(U)(iii)

(2000) (attempts, conspiracies, or solicitation also

qualify).
See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
Id. See also, Taylor v. U.S., 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (defining burglary).
66.
67.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
68.
See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). See generally Saucedo supranote63 (discussing the
U Visa's potential application in cases of workplace exploitation).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (U) (i)(1) (stating victims who suffered substantial physical
69.
or mental abuse as a result of criminal activity are eligible).
65.

70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1) (2007).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (U) (i) (2012).
8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b).
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The INA states that DHS should determine eligibility.74 But Congress and DHS developed an application procedure that in many
ways shifts this determination to local law enforcement agencies. In
order to apply for a U visa, a person must submit a personal statement describing their experience as a crime victim, attesting to
their suffering and documenting other pertinent evidence bearing
on their eligibility. 75 The applicant must include a form signed by a
law enforcement agency-typically a police officer, prosecutor, or
judge-certifying that the person "has been a victim" of qualifying
criminal activity, that the agency is investigating the crime, and that
the person possesses information about the crime and is being
76
helpful to the investigation.
The procedure by which the U visa program is implemented creates tension between national immigration policy and the local law
enforcement bodies. In effect, the law enforcement certification
procedure shifts to local law enforcement the critical assessments
that determine eligibility for the U visa: Is the person a genuine
victim, and is he or she assisting law enforcement? This shift of responsibility has attracted criticism because it allows for
inconsistencies in the implementation of a national program.7 7 This
runs counter to the usual rule that immigration policy should be
uniform across the country and is thus a federal responsibility. 78 It
also opens the possibility for law enforcement agencies to exert unusual leverage over immigrant victims.
Some law enforcement officials from areas with strong anti-immigrant sentiments expressed hostility to the idea of providing visas to
immigrant crime victims. 7 For example, media reports indicate

that prosecutors and police in Maricopa Country, Arizona, home of
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, have resisted certifying U visas, especially when

74.
75.
76.

8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15) (U) (i).
8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2) (2007).
Id.
See, e.g., Derek Quizon and Katie Urbaszewski, Visa rules are loosefor illegal immigrants

77.
who are victims of crimes, ARIZ. RE.PUBLIC (Aug. 19, 2010) (describing differing practices of
prosecutors in certifying or not certifying U visas).

78.
See Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 25, 2012); see generally Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration-Courts, 101 CA. L. REv. 553, 553 (2013) ("prosecutors
can exercise their gatekeeping power to deviate from or completely unsettle federal immigration enforcement priorities ....
); Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual Purposev of the U Visa JTwarted
in a Legislative Duel, 29 ST. Louis U. PuB. L REV. 373, 392 (2010) (shifting immigration decision-making power to local officials "fatally alter[s] the symbiotic balance that Congress
envisioned ....
).
79.
See Tahja L. Jensen, Comment, U Visa "Certification": Overconing the Local Hurdle in
Response to a Federal Statute, 45 IDAlto L. REv. 691, 704 (2009).
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80
there is no trial and the victim's presence is not required in court.

DHS advises that authorities can issue U visa certification even if
police are not actively investigating the case or no charges are
filed 81 But the federal government cannot require state and local
governments to carry out its policies.8 2 As a result, localities may
cooperate with victims in obtaining a U visa only when it suits them,
which may not be what the federal government intends. DHS itself
has advised localities that deciding whether to sign U visa certifications "is under the authority of the agency conducting the
'8 3
investigation or prosecution."

IV. GOOD

IMMIGRANTS,

BAD IMMIGRANTS, AND GENDER

In the American immigration system, victim visas lie at the cross8 4
roads between positive and negative images of immigrants. Most
of the beneficiaries would otherwise be unauthorized "illegal
aliens," stigmatized for entering the country without permissiori
and for posing an economic, cultural, and security threat.5 5 Typically, being lawfully or unlawfully present in the U.S. has been seen
86
as the major dividing line between "good" and "bad" immigrants.
But if unauthorized immigrants prove that they are genuine victims
of persecution for asylum, of trafficking for the T visa, or of serious
crime for the U visa, then the "illegal alien" can be transformed
8 7
into a victim deserving of protection.
As Fatma Marouf has explained, legally derived labels like "legal
immigrant" influence social conceptions of who is inside and who is
outside the national community. 88 Although these labels create the
See Immigrants in Arizona face resistance to gettingvisas after being victims of crimes, PUBLIC
80.
RADio INT'l. (October 27, 2012), http://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-27/immigrants-arizona-face-resistance-getting-visas-afte r-being-victims-crimes.
81.

DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE

4 [hereinafter DHS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-u visa-certifica
tion-guide.pdf.
82.

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

83.

DHS, supra note 81, at 15.

84.
SeeJoey Hipolito, Illegal Aliens or Deserving Victims?: The Ambivalent Implementation of the
U visa Program, 17 AsIAN AM. L. J. 153, 166 (2010) (explaining the positive and negative
societal perceptions of immigrant).
85.

See id. at 166-67.

86.
See Peter H. Schuck, Immigration at the Turn of the New Century, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INr'L L. 1, 7 (2001).

87.

Hipolito, supra note 84, at 168-69.

88.
See Fatma E. Marouf, Regrouping America: Immigration Policies and the Reduction of
Prejudice, 15 ILsv. Lsr. L. Rv. 129, 138-42 (2012).
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illusion of an indelible identity, the legal categories are fluid.89 Elizabeth Keyes has observed that legal complexities often serve as
proxies for deeper "questions of worthiness."9' 1 Mapped onto conceptions of worthiness are two competing narratives of immigration
with deep roots in American history, one depicting immigrants as
pursuing the American Dream, and the other portraying immigrants as connected to crime and a hazard to American society."'
The U visa epitomizes this latter conception. By labeling certain immigrants as deserving of inclusion because they are victims of
crime, the program facilitates accusations of serious crime. In many
cases, these accusations are directed at other immigrants. The U
visa program often is the knife's edge that separates good/deserv92
ing immigrants from bad/undeserving ones.
By distinguishing between deserving and undeserving immigrants, different visa programs often perpetuate preconceived
images or narratives of the ideal beneficiary.9 3 But because it encompasses so many different kinds of crime, the U visa does not
have an obvious, prototypical victim.9 4 Moreover, since the U visa
relies on local officials to certify genuine victims, there can be as
many conceptions of deserving, ideal victims as there are law enforcement agencies. Visas for victims are often torn between a
desire to assist law enforcement and an interest in protecting victims, as the contrast between the VAWA and S visa programs shows.
This tension also exists in the contrast-some would say conflictbetween the U visa, which offers a visa to crime victims, and programs which allow immigration authorities to identify unauthorized
immigrants for deportation after they come in contact with local
5
law enforcement.9
89. See id. at 135-37.
90.
See Elizabeth Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the Shift to "Wrrthiness"
Undenines the 1965 Immigration Laws, Civil Rights Goals, 57 How. L.J. 899, 900 (2014).
91.
See Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond SainLv and Sinners: Discretionand the Need fi New Narratives
in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 216-17 (2012).
92.
Cf Jacqueline Bhabha, Internationalist Gatekeepers? The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human Rights, 15 HARV. HUM. Rrs..J. 155, 160-61 (2002) (explaining how asylum

advocacy and adjudication is a "pressure point" that legitimizes the distinction between genuine refugees and "unworthy forced migrants").
93. Hipolito, sulrra note 84, at 168 (discussing "iconic" concepts of deserving
immigrants).
94. Id. at 175.
95.

See generally Lindsey j. Gill, Secure Communities: Burdening Local Law Enforcement and

Undermining the U Visa, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2055 (2013). The most prominent of the
programs through which DHS identifies immigrants after contact with local law enforcement
was known as Secure Communities. This program was officially ended in November 2015
because it included provisions by which immigrants were detained after the time when they
would otherwise have been released by local law enforcement, which several courts found to
raise constitutional problems. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y Dep't Homeland
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The dual purposes of protecting victims and assisting law enforcement might be unified not only by a desire to designate
deserving victims, but also by a desire to rescue them. Dina Francesca Haynes has explained the impact of this concept of rescuing
victims with reference to the T visa program for victims of trafficking, which Congress established the same year as the U visa.9 6 T visa
applicants are also incentivized to cooperate with law enforcement,
though not to the same extent as U visa applicants. 97 Law enforcement agencies have focused their efforts on victims who are
rescued, neglecting those who escape on their own and then come
forward to ask for a visa.98 As Haynes explains, trafficking victims
often do not fit this image of a rescued victim:
Most victims of human trafficking are not "rescued" by anyone. They are not found by law enforcement, chained to a bed
in a brothel ....

The false assumption that real victims are

those who are rescued by anyone, let alone by a federal agent,
and the converse assumption that those who rescue themselves
are not or are less likely to be real victims, distorts the government's ability to understand the true nature of the problem. 99
One practical advantage of being rescued is that the rescuer is an
independent witness, who can confirm that the victim's suffering is
genuine. By contrast, an immigrant who escapes faces more questions and doubts.10 1 But the concept of rescue is more powerful
than that. When an American rescues an immigrant, the American
feels like a hero. The rescue narrative evokes a relationship between victim and rescuer and suggests a villain, the perpetrator who
the victim escaped. Images of victim, villain, and rescuer are highly
gendered: both hero and villain are typically masculine, while the
victim is feminine. In U visa cases, the masculine and feminine distinctions are literal, as domestic violence accounts for the majority
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, ICE, Megan Moch, officer, Office of Civil

Rights and Civil Liberties, and Philip A. McNamara, Assistant Sec'y for Intergovernmental
Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014) available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_secure-communities.pdf. However, while the detention aspects of Secure
Communities have been curtailed, DHS continues to identify potentially deportable people
through partnerships with local police. Id.
96.
See Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual,Legal,
and ProceduralFailures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims ProtectionAct, 21 GFo. ImMJGR.

97.
98.

L.J. 337346 (2007).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(T)(i)(III) (aa) (2012); see also discussion, infra, at Part VI.C.
Haynes, supra note 96, at 350-52.

99.

Id. at 351.

100.

See id. at 350.
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of U visa applications; prototypically, a female victim levels an accusation against a male defendant. 0 1
As I discussed in Part II, concern about domestic violence
loomed large in the development of the U visa, and has dominated
2 The government does not publish statistics
discussion of it since. 10
breaking down the frequency of each crime in applications for U
visas. However, of the U visa's twenty-six qualifying crimes, ten have
an implicit sexual or gender component. 10

3

On its face, this does

not mean that Congress intended to favor women over men or that
men do not benefit from the U visa. With the exception of female
genital mutilation, men can be and are victims of these crimes.
Rather, the U visa program is strongly attached to a conception of
primarily female victims and male perpetrators. 0 4 At least for the
05
crime of domestic violence, this perception is often true.1
To see the impact of gender on the U visa program, it is significant to note that Congress seems to perceive gender and sex as
factors that make a crime victim more deserving of immigration
benefits. 116 A relatively non-violent crime with a sexual or gender

element is more likely to qualify for a U visa. Simple assault must be
"felonious assault" to qualify, which typically means it requires an
aggravating element such as a weapon or injury. But the Supreme
101. CECELIA FRIEDMAN LFVIN, U CAP UPIDAIE FROM USCIS & ADDIIIONAL UPDATES FROM
VSC STFAKHOLDER TELECONFERENCE 3, Dec. 11, 2013, available at http://www.asistahelp.org/

documents/news/U-cap-advisory-andnotesfrom-stakh60F50EB294846.pdf ("About 75%
of U visas are based in domestic violence or domestic violence/sexual assault crimes."). See
also, Crick, infra note 104 (women are more frequently victims of domestic violence than
men).
102. See Gill, supra note 95, at 2065 ("Although federal law incorporates a long list of
qualifying crimes that create U visa eligibility for victims, Congress sought specifically to address concerns about domestic violence."). For examples of media depictions of the U visa
program, see infra notes 111 -112.
103.

MIGRANTr

See U.S. CrI1ZENSIIIP & IMMIGRAT1-ION SERV., VITIMS OF CRIMINAL ACrIvrfV: U NONIM-

STATUs,

http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-

crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonnimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-noninmigrant-status (abusive sexual conduct, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, incest,
prostitution, rape, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, stalking, and trafficking). See aLo 114
Stat. 1518 Sec. 1502(a) (2000) (Congressional findings citing specific concern for "women
and children").
104. Cf Melody M. Crick, Access Denied: The Problem of AtuSed Men in Washington, 27 SEATTLE U. L. R-v. 1035, 1036 (2004) (" 'domestic violence' is so synonymous with the term
'battered women' that male victims of abuse often find their female abusers labeled as the
victim.").
105. See Molly Dragiewicz and Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence:
StatisticalDatafor Lawyers ConsideringEqual ProtectionAnalysis, 17 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POi'Y
& L. 229, 247-251 (2009) (summarizing data that women are more likely than men to be the
victims of violence by intimate partners, are much more likely to be injured, and are more
likely to be killed).
106. See, e.g.,
Saucedo, supra note 63, at 909 (noting the gendered nature of the U visa
qualifying crimes).
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Court in 2014 noted that " ' [d]omestic violence' is not merely a
type of 'violence;' it is a term of art encompassing acts that one
10 7
might not characterize as 'violent' in a nondomestic context."
Because the list of qualifying crimes prominently feature genderrelated offenses, the U visa can be understood as institutionalizing a
certain conception of gender roles. In order to apply for the U visa,
a noncitizen must: (1) declare herself a victim, both to law enforcement and to CIS, and (2) accuse another person of the crime, in
order to cooperate with law enforcement in its investigation.108
Given the nature of the qualifying crimes, this frequently means a
woman accuses a man, since domestic violence is a leading basis for
U Visa applications. Moreover, if women report domestic violence,
one immigrant is often accusing another immigrant of a crime,
which may impose significant immigration consequences for
both. 10 9 While victims of domestic violence are potentially eligible
to stay in the U.S. legally through the U visa program, an immigrant
convicted of domestic violence is likely deportable, even if he previously enjoyed legal permanent residence."l 0
Female victims of domestic violence dominate the media's sympathetic depiction of the U visa program."' Such portrayals
consistently depict vulnerable, unauthorized immigrant women falling victim to abusive male partners who are also immigrants. These
women are then either afraid to seek help or find salvation through
the U visa. One article in The New York Times opened by explaining
how the U visa allowed a woman in this situation to turn the tables
on her abuser:
Castleman v. United States, No. 12-1371, slip op. at 6-7 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2014).
See, supra Part III.
A significant portion of unauthorized immigrant households consist of couples or
with children. JEFFREYS. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTrER, A PoRTRAIr
OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNIrED STATES 5 (Apr. 14, 2009) (stating that seventyfive percent of households headed by unauthorized immigrants consist of couples, fortyseven percent of all such households were couples with children and fifteen percent couples
without children). Thus, if one partner in such a relationship accuses the other of domestic
violence, both the victim and the accused will likely be unauthorized immigrants.
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012).
107.
108.
109.
couples

111.

See, e.g., Some Immigrant Women, Victims of Domestic Violence, Afraid to Seek Help, Pun.

RAmO Ir'i, (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-03-21/some-inmnigrantwomen-victims-domestic-violence-afraid-seek-help; Devin Sanchez, Undocumented Immigrants
Protected Under the Violence Against Women Act, NBC LFITNO, (Mar. 12, 2013), http://nbclatino
.com/2013/03/12/undocumented-immigrants-protected-under-the-violence-against-womenact; Pamela Constable, ForImmigrant Women, Domestic Violence Creates a Double Shadow, WAsu.

PosT, (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/for-inimigrantwomen-domestic-violence-creates-a-double-shadow/2013/12/02/5626b85e-55e6-11e3-8304caf30787c0a9 story.html; Sarah Childress, For Shadow Victims of Violence, the "U Visa" Can Help,
PBS FRONrLINE, (June 24, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/social-issues/
rape-in-the-fields/for-shadow-victims-of-violence-the-u-visa-can-help/.
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She was 14 when her mother smuggled her into Los Angeles. She met her future husband, a legal resident, two years
later.
He had all the cards, and played them cruelly, as she recalls.
He would not let her go to school or work, dragged his feet on
supporting her citizenship request, and called her fat and ugly
after she became pregnant.
She endured it all-until she caught him romancing a 13year-old girl from their church choir. When she complained,
he beat her bloody, tried to rape her, and fled, with the girl, to
Arizona, she said in an affidavit that is now part of federal immigration records.
Today, he is in prison, and she is caring for her children in
San Francisco, with a driver's license and a legal job baby-sitting. Her legal status came about through what is known as a U
visa-a humanitarian "island of niceness," as one advocate
called it, in a sea of restrictive United States immigration
laws. ' 12
This story touches the narrative high points of a prime time television show. The domestic violence survivor is rescued and rebuilds
her life. The villain meets justice and is punished. The existence of
a government program that makes this happen is praiseworthy.
Moreover, the peril and the drama involved are very real. But it is
also important to recognize that not every case will present such
moral or factual clarity. In a complicated case, the inherent appeal
of a narrative that relies on clear distinctions between good and bad
can be dangerous. While the system helps the perceived victim, it
hurts the perceived perpetrator. That's good if we are sure he is
guilty. But precisely because this is such an appealing story, we may
be too eager to believe it, which is a problem when the evidence is
more conflicted.
Political scientists have developed the "chivalry thesis" to explain
the role that gender plays in criminal adjudication." 13Empirical research has demonstrated that women defendants seem to fare
112.

Katherine Ellison, A Special Visa Program BenefiL Abmsed Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 8, 2010, at A19.
113. See Margaret Farnsworth & Raymond H.C. Teske, Jr., Gender Differences in Felony Court
Processing: Three H)/othesis of Disparity, 6 WOMEN & CaM. JusT. 23 (1995); Steven F. Shatz &
Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not Dead: Murder, Gender and the Death Penalty, 27 BERi'l-n J
GENDER L. &Just. 64 (2012); Chimene I. Keitner, Victim or Vamp? Images of Violent Women in
the CriminalJusticeSystem, 11 COi.UM. J. GENDER & L. 38 (2002); Peter W. Hahn & Susan D.
Clayton, The Effects of Attorney PresentationStyle, Attorney Gender, andJuror Gender onJurorDecisions,, 20 L. AND HUM. BEHAV. 533, 543 (1996).
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better than men in criminal sentencing of similar cases." 4 Men who
commit a single rape-murder of a woman are more likely to be sentenced to death than men who murder multiple people without the
sexual assault element.' 15 Political scientists theorize that social
norms of chivalry call upon men to protect women from harm because they are perceived as helpless. Fernando Rodriguez,
Theodore R. Curry, and Gang Lee explain:
The chivalry thesis posits that gendered stereotypes about
women and men influence sentencing outcomes according to
the sex of the offenders. Sometimes called paternalism, chivalry asserts that women are stereotyped as fickle and childlike,
and therefore not fully responsible for their criminal behavior.
Women therefore need to be protected by males who, with all
due gallantry, are portrayed as wanting to minimize any pain
6
or suffering women might experience. 1
The chivalry thesis incorporates stereotyped images of both idealized victims and idealized perpetrators. It has provocative
implications when combined with Americans' perceptions of men
of color as violent and women from the global south as oppressed.
The United States may be acting on a chivalrous impulse to protect
foreign women from the perceived threat posed to them by men
from their own countries and cultures. The U visa literally does this
in many cases by extending a significant benefit to immigrant
women who accuse men-also likely to be immigrants-of violence.
Jayashri Srikantiah observed that in the context of anti-trafficking
policy, law enforcement tends to imagine an "iconic victim," who
contrasts with the criminal trafficker.' 17The preference is to depict
"victims as completely blameless," which "allows full blame for the
trafficking enterprise to be placed on traffickers."",, This dichotomy blinds the law to the moral complexity of human relationships
especially in trafficking; motivations and actions are often neither
entirely coercive nor entirely voluntary, and victims may maintain
114.

14J.

See generally, Margareth Etienne, Sentencing Women: Reassessing the Claims of Disparity,

GENDER RACE

&JusT. 73 (2011); Cassia Spohn,John Grahl & Susan Welch, The Impact of

the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges,25 CRIMiNOLOGY

175 (1987); S. Fernando Rodriguez, Theodore R. Curry & Gang Lee, Gender

Differences in Clinical Sentencing: Do Effects Vary Across Violent, Property, and DrugOffenses, 87 No.

2 Soc. Sci. Q. 318 (2006).
115. Shatz & Shatz, supra note 113, at 98, 101.
116. Rodriguez et al., supra note 114, at 320.
117. Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic

Human Trafficking Law, 87 Bosr. U. L. Rv. 157, 195 (2007).
118. Id. at 195-96.
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affinity for their abusers. 19 The potential for moral complexity may
be even greater in many domestic violence cases, which emerge
within troubled, intimate relationships.
Lawyers and victim advocates can play a problematic role in filtering complicated human conflicts into simplistic moral
narratives. 120 The U visa targets victims from other countries, especially unauthorized immigrants who are especially likely to be nonwhite.' 2 1 Just as critical race and gender scholars observe that domestic violence cases play into stereotypes of black male violence,
post-colonial scholars raise a similar critique-the human rights discourse focuses on the oppression of women in the global south,
particularly women in Muslim countries.1 22 Srikantiah summarizes
this stereotype in her description of the "iconic victim" of
trafficking:
Iconic victims originate from cultures in Asia, Latin America,
or Africa stereotypes as suppressing the individuality of women
and girls and rendering them simple prey for manipulation by
clever traffickers. The iconic victim concept is thus consistent
with stereotypes of foreign women and women of color as
meek, helpless, and belonging to repressive male dominant
cultures.

23

Smeetra Mishra analyzed portrayals of Muslim men and women
by The New York Times during the two years following the September
11 attacks. Mishra found that The New York Times conveyed "dominant representations of Muslim men as violent and dangerous and
Muslim women as victims of oppression."'124 Noting that American
political leaders justified American military operations against the
Taliban in part as a campaign to liberate Afghan women, Mishra
wrote that the War on Terror could be described as "saving Muslim
women and fighting Muslim men."125
119.
120.
121.

id. at 197-98.
See Bhabha, supra note 92, at 162.
For instance, the majority of unauthorized immigrants in the United States are from
Mexico. SeeJ FFREY S. PASSELL & D'Vi.-RA COIN, PFW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPJLAI ION: NATIONAL ANt) STATE TRENDS, 2010, (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhis

panic.org/2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state-trends2010/.
122. See generally LtDA Atiu-LucGHoD, Do MUSLIM WOMEN NiEEDiI)
SAVING? (2013); Christine
M. Jacobsen & Dag Stenvoll, Muslim Women and Foreign Prostitutes: Victim Discourse, Subjectivity,

and Governance, 17 Soc. Pot.. 270 (2010).
123. Srikantiah, supra note 117, at 201-02.
124. Smeetra Mishra, "Saving"Muslim Women and FightingMuslim Men: Analysis of Representations in The New York Times, 6 GLOBAL MEDIA J. 1, 1 (2007).

125.

Id.
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Such gendered preconceptions of foreign men may benefit
crime victims. Jacqueline Bhabha observed that a lawyer representing an asylum-seeker is under "pressure to generate simplistic, even
derogatory characterizations of asylum seekers' countries of origin,
as areas of barbarism or lack[ing] . ..civility in order to present a

clear-cut picture of persecution."'' 26 To win an asylum case, an applicant must describe his or her country as persecuting; a U visa
applicant must depict the criminal perpetrator as villainous and the
crime as especially traumatic. Developing a narrative that positions
one's client favorably is sound advocacy, but it carries a downside.
Bhabha warns:
While understandable as a pragmatic strategy to maximize the
chances of a successful outcome, this approach easily turns
into stereotyp[ing], even cultural arrogance. It denies the political complexities in the state of origin, where oppositional
forces may mount challenges to the oppressive behaviors cited.
Moreover it is reductive: differing conceptions of gender, religious or age-based roles and rights within the state, and the
culture or religion of the asylum seeker may be homogenized
into a uniform picture-a stereotype may come to stand in for
27
the variety of possible forms of oppression.
In the case of the U visa, the danger is more immediate than the
perpetuation of reductive stereotypes. The person on the wrong
side of this pragmatic narrative stands to be prosecuted, punished,
and possibly deported.
Similarly, some feminist scholars criticize anti-domestic violence
campaigns for focusing on a narrow conception of the perfect victim.'

28

Elizabeth MacDowell describes this idealized image of a

victim as "a fictive construct that floats ghost-like between historical,
social and subjective reality, and is generally identified as passive,
dependent, white, middle-class, heterosexual, and female."'' 29 But
MacDowell observes that the perfect victim trope and adherence to
126. Bhabha, suprra note 92, at 162.
127. Bhabha, supra note 92, at 162; see also Srikantiah, supra note 117, at 196 (noting that
focus on victims' rights in criminal justice obscures the fact that "[i]n the real world . ..
victims are not perfectly innocent and perpetrators are not perfectly evil.").
128. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? Wien She Fights
Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 91 (2008); Adele Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence
(Di.)Course. Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. Rsv. 1061,

1078-91 (2006).
129. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizingfrom Particularity:Perpetratorsand IntersectionalThemoyon Domestic Violence, 16J. GENDER, RACE &Jusr.531, 533 (2013).
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its criteria is only one side of this equation. 130 On the other side is a
perpetrator, typically a man, and, in the case of domestic assaults
involving immigrants, frequently a person of color. A number of
critical legal scholars have noted that when African-American men
are accused of domestic violence and other crimes, the accusation
plays into a stereotype of black male violence.'' Latino men are
32
similarly stereotyped as criminal and potentially violent.
This is not meant to imply that domestic violence and sexual assault are not major problems in immigrant communities-quite the
contrary. Part V.A illustrates that gender-based violence is widespread in immigrant communities, as well as among nonimmigrants. This deserves attention and it likely needs more. However, the problem is that the U visa does not only protect a victim; it
also involves accusing a person of a serious crime, triggering serious
consequences. As MacDowell writes, "A victim requires a perpetrator, an identity that is construed in opposition to the perfect
victim."'133- Depicting a more evil perpetrator creates the expectation

of a more pure victim, which does not serve the real interests of
abused women. 134

As awareness of gender violence among immigrants increases,
some may become more prone to believe accusations against immigrant men. This has dire consequences for defendants who are
entitled to the presumption of innocence when charged with
crimes. That does not mean that victims should not be protected or
believed. The point here is not to minimize domestic violence. Instead, the framework emphasizes that seemingly simplistic
narratives of good and evil are often complicated, individualized,
and difficult to judge. Even assuming that a large majority of victims
are truthful, there can still be a serious problem in some cases
where the victim may be exaggerating or fabricating. This poses a
danger for innocent criminal defendants. Although defendants
should not be convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
innocent defendants may feel pressure to accept a plea bargain
rather than risk conviction at trial. Instead of generalizing about
130. Id. at 546.
131. See Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and Mhile: Racialized Gender Stereotypev in
Gender Violence, 8 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 1, 10, 16 (1998); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar
Black Maculinity: Intersectionality,Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS

L. REv. 853, 875-79 (2006) (describing the image of the "bad black man").
132. See, e.g., Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of
Race, National Origin, and Gender DifferentiaLs, 14 B.C. TillRD WORLn LJ. 231, 240 (1994).

133. MacDowell, supra note 129, at 547.
134.

See Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An Anti-Essentialist

Proposa4 31 WASi. U.J. L & PoL. 39, 51 (2009) ("essentializing men who batter is as problematic as essentializing women who are battered.").
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whether allegations of violence and crime in immigration communities are exaggerated, a balanced system must protect victims
without prejudicing the accused.

V.

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE U VISA

A. The Quota and the Waiting List

Congress authorizes only 10,000 U visas per year, excluding family members of crime victims.

13 5

This limitation did not generate

immediate problems because implementation of the U visa was
slow. Not a single U visa was issued during the first year of the
law. 136 The government did not issue regulations governing the U

visa program for seven years.

37

However, by the time the program

began operation in 2008, many applications had been filed and
were backlogged. As a result, DHS issued the maximum number of
visas that year, although 10,000 applications had not been filed in
2008 or 2009.1-18
By 2010, the number of applications for U visas exceeded the
annual cap. 39 Applications have continued to rise rapidly.' 4" At the
same time, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
finds that because the majority of U visa applicants are eligible on
the merits, a long wait has developed.' 4 1 Roughly speaking, at current approval rates, any year in which more than 13,000 people
apply for a U visa creates a backlog. 42 In 2012, nearly 25,000 applications were filed. 143 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the basic problem. If
this continues, more and more qualified applicants will have to wait
to receive visas, and the waiting times will likely grow. On December
11, 2013, USCIS announced that it had already reached the 10,000
184

(p) (2) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d) (2013) (applying the annual cap
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1
only to U-1 visas, not the U-2, U-3, U-4 and U-5 visas given to family members).
136. Kwong, supra note 38, at 151.
137. Hipolito, supra note 84, at 155.
138. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., USCIS Approves 10,000 U Visas
for 6th Straight Year (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-approves-10000-uvisas-6th-straight-fiscal-year. See also Hiplito, supra note 84, at 155-56.
139. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMICRATION SERV. (USCIS), PETrIION FOR U NONIMMICRANT STATUS VISA RECEIPTS, APPROVALS AND DENIAls, FISCAL YEARS 2002 TIROUGH 2013, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/defaul t/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Im
migration %20Forms%2OData/Victims/914t-918u visastatistics_2012-dec.pdf.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (reporting 10,122 U visa approvals and 2,866 denials in 2012, for an acceptance
rate of seventy-seven percent).
143. /d. (24,768 applications filed in 2012).
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visa cap for fiscal year 2014, and it would not begin issuing U visas
again until October 1, 2014.144
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Expansion of the U visa program has been caught up in the stalemate over comprehensive immigration reform in Congress, which
144. U.S.
145.

Id.

146.

Id.

CrrIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATnON SERV.,

supra note 139.
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remains stalled at time of writing (May 2015).47 Still, some benefits
are available to U visa applicants as they wait for a visa to be available under the quota. USCIS adjudicates whether the application is
eligible for a visa and sends approval notices accordingly. 148

USCIS

maintains a waiting list for eligible petitions and issues visas according to the date the petition was filed. 149 Petitioners on the waiting
list may be granted deferred action-that is, prosecutorial discretion to not seek deportation-and will not be considered unlawfully
present in the U.S. 5 0 This allows petitioners to ask for employment
15
authorization during their waiting time. 1
The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), an advocate of more
restrictive immigration policies, has attacked the U visa program for
attracting exaggerated crime reports. CIS claims that the program
resulted in "visa-creating crime" because applications for U visas
climbed dramatically while overall crime rates declined.1 52 This critique is easily answered. No established procedure to apply for a U
53
visa existed before 2008, so applications naturally increased since.
Moreover, there is no reason to be surprised by the number of people who have valid U visa applications. According to figures cited by
CIS, in 2012, one violent crime was committed for every 258 inhabitants of the United States. 154 Using this as a rough measure for
purposes of discussion, with 11 million unauthorized immigrants in
the country, it would be reasonable to expect at least 42,635 potential U visa applicants each year. This is much higher than both the
quota of available visas and the number of actual applicants. If anything, there is reason to consider this an under-estimate of the
potential number of valid U Visa applicants. The FBI category of
"violent crime" is actually narrower than the U visa list of qualifying
147. See Editorial, Special Visas for Abused Women Hit a Ceiling, (U visas Hit a Ceiling) N. Y.
TIMES, Sep. 3, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/opinion/special-visasfor-abused-women-hit-a-ceiling.html; Suzy Khimm, The Violence Againt Women Act is on Life Suppart, WASi. Posr, Jan. 25, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkbIog/wp/2013/01/25/the-violence-against-women-act-is-on-life-support/.
148. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c) (5) (i)(A) (2013).
149. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d) (2).
150. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d) (3).
151. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2).
152. David North, Crime, Generally, in the U.S. Is Down, But Visa-CreatingCrime Soars, CENTER
FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (BLoG) (December 18, 2013), http://cis.org/north/crime-generally-us-down-visa-creating-crime-soar.
153. See Hipolito, supra note 84, at 153, 155-156 (describing the slow implementation of
the U visa until 2009).
154. North, supra note 152 ("The widely used, expensively maintained 'Crime in the
United States,' a long-existing FBI research tool, showed that there were 431.9 violent crimes
for every 100,000 inhabitants of the United States in 2009. In 2012, the number was 386.9, a
decline of 10.4 percent.").
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crimes, so the actual number of potential U visa applicants is likely
to be higher.155 Of particular relevance, this FBI category does not

include all cases of domestic violence because it only includes aggravated assaults with weapons or deadly force. 156 It also includes
57
"forcible rape," but not lesser forms of sexual assault.1
The inadequacy of the U visa quota is even more glaring compared to estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence and
sexual assaults. According to data compiled by the American Bar
Association, around a quarter of all women in the United States
have been the victims of an assault by an intimate partner during
their lifetimes. 58 Men are assaulted by their partners more frequently than many realize, but fewer than eight percent of men
have been victims of partner assaults. 59 Women account for nearly
eighty-five percent of spousal violence victims.' 6" Reported rates of
domestic violence and sexual assault appear to be similarly high
among communities likely to include many immigrants.' 6 ' A survey
of "Hispanic Texas females" found that two in five women reported
experiencing serious abuse, and one in five women reported being
raped.1 62 A survey of Filipina women in San Francisco found that
63
one in five women reported being victims of domestic violence.1
The implications of these rates of violence against women are
staggering in terms of estimating the number of people who could
conceivably qualify for U visas. Among the unauthorized immigrant
16 4
population in the U.S., an estimated 4.1 million are adult women.
Even assuming that a modest percentage of these women may be
155. According to the FBI, "violent crime is composed of four offenses: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Violent crimes are
defined in the UCR Program as those offenses which involve force or threat of force." FIn.
BUREAU OF INVE"STIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATEs 2010 (Sep. 2011), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/abott-us/cjis/ticr/crime-in-the-Lu.s/20 1/ci-iine-in-the-u.s.-2010/violent-crime/
violentcrimemain.pdf. The FBI definition of violent crime thus would not include U visa
qualifying crimes such as extortion, prostitution, peonage, obstruction of justice, and lower
forms of sexual of assault.
156. FEn. BUREAU OF INVESTI.ATION, CRIME IN TIHE UNITED STATES 2010, AGGRAVATI..D AsSAU:Ir (Sep. 2011), avaikble at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/violent-crime/aggravatedassaultmain.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Am. BAR ASS'N (ABA), COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL. VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE STAIS-TICS, www.americanbar.oi-g/groups/domestic-violence/resources/statistics
.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).

159.
160.
161.
nese")
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id. The data reported here defines populations by ethnicity (i.e. "Hispanic," "Chirather than by immigration and citizenship status.
Id.
Id.
PASSEL & COIN, supra note 109, at 4.
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victims of domestic violence, the number of people eligible for U
visas far outstrips the quota. Figure 4 illustrates this.

FIGURE 4: ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS OF POTENTIAL FEMALE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE SURVIVORS AMONG UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS

Assumed Rate of
Domestic Violence

Estimated Number of
Potential U Visa
Beneficiaries

1 in 100 women

41,000

1 in 20 women

205,000

1 in 5 women

820,000

Annual U Visa Quota
10,000

*Estimates ba.ed on a total population of 4. 1 million adult unauthorized immigrant women.

B. The Suspicion Trap
The U visa can potentially swing the incentives offered to immigrant crime victims. The standard justification for granting visas to
crime victims is that, in the words of Orde Kittrie, " [t] heir status as
deportable aliens . . . renders them vulnerable to abuse and exploitation." 65 The idea here is that unauthorized immigrants are
disadvantaged relative to citizens and legal immigrants. The remedy
for this challenge may be to try to equalize the situation for immigrants and citizens, but the U visa does much more. The U visa is an
incentive to accuse. The U visa rewards unauthorized immigrants
for accusing other people of serious crimes. These rewards are not
offered to other people, except perhaps to co-conspirators who testify for the state.
In order to qualify, not only must an immigrant suffer as a victim,
but also must assist law enforcement. In effect, victims must accuse
others. Moreover, because only certain crimes make an immigrant
eligible for a U visa, there is an incentive to make a more serious
accusation. Simple assault would not qualify, but aggravated assault
would. 166 The immigrant similarly must claim a high degree of suffering because of the crime, which will often make the crime
appear to be more serious. In localities where police and prosecutors are more reluctant to certify U visas, immigrants may
165. Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91
IOWA L. REv. 1449, 1451 (2006).
166. See discussion supra Part III.
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experience even greater pressure to make their accusations more
serious.
Reasonable people may disagree about whether this incentive is
disconcerting. As explained supra, no concrete evidence suggests
that U visa applications are being fabricated on a wide scale. If anything, more people may be eligible than are applying. 167 The fear of
approaching police may be so high for some immigrants that some
incentive to report crime is necessary to achieve rough parity with
citizens. But even if evidence of widespread fraud has yet to
emerge, an incentive to accuse could raise concern that some individual crime reports might be at least exaggerated if not entirely
fabricated. For present purposes, it suffices to recognize that this
incentive exists in the structure of the U visa system.
In the hands of an aggressive defense attorney, this incentive
structure would be called motive to lie. This concern is serious
given the close connection between U visas and domestic violence.
Domestic violence cases raise considerable concerns due to high
rates of witness recantations and false statements 16 and a tendency
for victims to stop cooperating with police and prosecutors. 69
There are multiple reasons why a genuine victim may do this, including trauma, learned helplessness (popularly known as the
171
Battered Woman Syndrome), or pressure from the perpetrator. 1
The U visa's requirement that victims continue to assist police uses
coercion to counter this. Forcing victims to assist police is consistent with other policies designed to prevent witnesses from
undermining prosecution, such as mandatory arrest, compelling
'
immediate sworn witness statements, and "no-drop prosecutions.'

71

But these policies can be problematic, considering that recanting
and becoming uncooperative sometimes serves as a survivor strat172
egy-a way for a victim to control what happens to her family.
A lawyer developing a defense theory would suggest that a witness recanted simply because their accusation was untrue. 173 When
a witness directly recants a previous statement, at least one of their
167. See supra, Part V.A.
168. Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjuryin Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M.
L. REv. 149, 149 (2009) (summarizing research finding false or recanted statements in forty
to ninety percent of domestic violence cases).
169. Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBattered After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 768 ("Victims of
domestic violence are more prone than other crime victims to recant or refuse to cooperate
after initially providing information to police.").
170. See Rutledge, supra note 168, at 166.
171. Cf id. at 177-182 (describing these policies).
172. See id. at 170-172 (describing the survivor thesis).
173. See id. at 150 (recanting victims may be divided into those who were filing a false
report, and those who are genuine victims who recant later for other reasons).
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two statements must logically be false. Moreover, an accusation can
be only partially true, but still do great harm to the accused. Domestic violence does not require the same level of force or threat that
might be required for other violent crimes. 174 In the context of a
heated argument between two angry spouses, it takes very little exaggeration to cause a problem for the criminal justice system. The
difference between "he threw a plate" and "he threw a plate at me"
can be the difference between a bad fight and a criminal offense.
For an immigrant with legal residency, these few additional words
may be the difference between staying in the country and being
deported. Even misdemeanor domestic violence can be a removable offense.

75

In these cases, the potential defense argument is straightforward.
An unauthorized immigrant couple finds their relationship falling
apart, and they are likely to split. One of them realizes that this is
also an opportunity. The next time they have a fight, she calls the
police. If she convinces the police that she is a genuine victim, her
partner will be arrested and may be deported, while she and her
childrens get U visas and a path to citizenship. The U visa provides
fodder for this narrative because it gives witnesses a potentially powerful motive to make false or exaggerated reports. Defendants have
every right to pursue this line of defense. It is their constitutional
right to expose potential ulterior motives of alleged victims. Yet,
this line of impeachment will apply equally to U visa applicants who
are genuinely victims. This is the U visa's suspicion trap. The U visa
fuels doubts about the credibility of victims-doubts that the vic76
tims of gender-based violence do not need. 1
As knowledge and understanding of the U visa spreads in immigrant communities, this defense narrative becomes more plausible.
The growth of attorney advertisements promoting the U visa, such
as the billboards in Las Vegas pictured on the first page of this article, enhance this worry. This trend is a double-edged sword. There
is a continuing need to inform immigrant communities about the
availability of potential protection from deportation for crime victims, especially given that the rate of applications is much lower
than the expected rate of qualifying victims. Yet such attorney advertising shifts the focus from protecting vulnerable people to
taking advantage of the opportunity to get a visa. This kind of shift
174.
175.
176.
L. Rev.
turned

See Castleman v. United States, No. 12-1371, slip op. at 6-7 (U.S. March 25, 2014).
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012).
Cf Mary Fan, Adversarial,]usticesCasualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection,55 B.C.
775 (2014) (critiquing the tendency for mechanisms intended to protect victims to be
into weapons against them in the American adversarial system of criminal justice).

University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform

[VOL.
48:4
[

is hardly remarkable in the crass arena of attorney advertising. In
personal injury law, a tort law textbook might speak idealistically
about making the victim whole. But a ubiquitous advertising cam77
paign in Las Vegas reframes it thus: "In a wreck? Need a check?"'
Although U visa advertising is tame and relatively informative in
comparison, spreading information about U visas plays perfectly
into a narrative that inherently undermines the credibility of witness-victims. A 2004 California domestic violence case in Santa
Clara, California, highlights this point. At trial, the defense crossexamined the victim about how she saw fliers explaining the immigration benefits included in the Violence Against Women Act
before she went to the police and filed a VAWA application. 78 The
victim hired her own attorney, asserting that answering such questions violated her right against self-incrimination because she would
79
be forced to admit that she was unlawfully present in the country.1
An appeals court required the victim to answer the cross-examination because "evidence of whether [the victim] had filed a VAWA
application was relevant to the defendant's assertion that Sonia
manufactured claims of spousal abuses, because a VAWA application provides a shortcut to adjusting an alien's immigration
status." 8 0

The difficulties with the U visa quota have important practical
consequences for this line of impeachment. Although criminal defendants have a right to a speedy trial, the wait for a U visa extends
beyond a year and seems to be growing. So, if a crime victim applies
for a U visa roughly at the time prosecution commences, the victim's U visa application will likely be pending when the criminal
case goes to trial. The application will certainly be pending at the
time of a preliminary hearing or plea negotiations. Thus, the witnesses' dependence on the good will of law enforcement peaks at
the moment when she must testify. If she does not cooperate with
prosecutors or police, they have the power to withhold or retract
the certification on which she depends for her visa application.
A criminal defendant's right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses includes impeaching a witness by exposing "ulterior motives
of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in
the case at hand.'

81

The promise of immigration benefits in ex-

change for testimony offers quintessential impeachment material
177.

Glen Lerner, Glen Lerner Injury Lauyers, If you're in a wreck, you need a check!!, YouTum
s

(Mar. 29,2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-hgtih5Ot2bik.
178. People v. Wong, 2004 WL 3015782 at 2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id.
181. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
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for precisely this reason. In 2005, the conviction of Osama Bin
Laden's personal secretary Wadih al-Hage was nearly jeopardized
because the government had suppressed videotapes showing that
the government offered a key witness assistance with his immigration case. Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy of the Southern District of
New York wrote:
In my forty-seven years at the bar and on the bench, I have
seen few routes to impeachment that are more effective than
words from a witness's own mouth suggesting that he understands he must shade his testimony in order to win the favor of
one of the parties. Where the witness seeks to curry favor with
the Government, the impression made upon the jury is generally quite significant.

82

Some state courts have allowed an immigration law violation to
be used for witness impeachment on the theory that it is a prior bad
act, potentially even an act of fraud.8 3 But other judges worry that
the immigration status of witnesses and defendants should not be
brought into cross-examination without careful analysis for fear of
pandering to the jury's prejudices for or against immigrants. 18 4 A
stronger basis for bringing up a witness' immigration status is that
unauthorized immigrants are especially vulnerable to pressure from
law enforcement that could lead them to bend their testimony in
favor of the prosecution. 8 5 In 2012, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that immigration status could be brought up in crossexamination only if there was a demonstrated link between immi18 6
gration concerns and a motive to testify falsely.
182. U.S. v. Bin Laden, 397 F. Supp. 2d 465, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (but finding that the
government's suppression of the information was not deliberate).
183. See Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status
and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. Rucv. 1417, 1427-29 (2011) (describing case law permitting cross-examination based on immigration violations).
184. See, e.g., People v. Perales-Hernandez, 2014 VL 710455, at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(trial court feared prejudice against "illegal immigrants" would prejudice the jury);
Doumbouya v. County Court, 224 P.3d 425, 427 (Col. Ct. App. 2009) (trial court feared that
telling the jury that convicting a defendant would lead to deportation would elicit unjustified
sympathy for the defendant).
185. Chin, supra note 183, at 1427-28.
186. State v. Jordan, 44 A.3d. 794, 815 (Conn. 2012); see aLvo Arroyo v. State, 259 S.W.3d
831, 835-36 (Tex. App. 2008) (when there is no evidence that witness received immigration
benefits from the state, defendant may be barred from cross-examining about witness' immigration status); Perez v. U.S., 968 A2d 39, 64-65 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009) (prosecution's failure to
disclose witness' statements about her immigration status did not violate Brady because it
would not have undermined her testimony).
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Defendants can often show such a nexus, especially in cases involving current or former domestic partners.8 7 As a Colorado court
found, " [i] t would be constitutionally problematic to preclude relevant impeachment simply because immigration is a 'hot button
topic.' "1881 The U visa, along with VAWA and the T visa, make it
especially likely that immigration issues will become legitimate
grounds for cross-examination and impeachment because these
programs explicitly tie immigration benefits to being a victim and
to making accusations to law enforcement. Unsurprisingly, in April
2014, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that a U
visa application is legitimate grounds for cross-examining a rape
victim. 189

As awareness of the U visa grows both among immigrants and in
the defense bar, defendants may more consistently attack the credibility of victims who sought or received immigration benefits from
police or prosecutors. This may particularly damage cases that involve the competing credibility of accusers and defendants, typically
the "he said/she said" situations inherent in many domestic violence and sexual assault cases. It should be noted that reported
cases and cases that go to trial are likely to be only the tip of the
iceberg. Since most criminal cases in the U.S. end in plea bargains, 90 the most common result may be to strengthen the hand of
defendants in plea negotiations. Prosecutors may fear subjecting
victims to cross-examination centering on immigration issues. This
could result in lighter convictions and sentences for people who
abuse immigrants-precisely the problem the U visa was established to counteract.
Because a U visa application may be fodder for witness impeachment, prosecutors are likely to disclose to the defense any
discussion of U visa certification with the witness. Under Brady v.
Maryland, prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.'" This includes materials that may be used to impeach a

187. See, e.g., Doumbonya, 224 P.3d at 429 (risk of defendant being deported was relevant
because "[t]he theory of the defense required motive for the defendant's estranged wife to
accuse him falsely. That motive, according to the defense, was a conviction that would lead to
the wife's being awarded custody of the couple's son.").
188. Id. at 428.
189. Commonwealth v. Sealy, 6 N.E.3d 1052, 1058 (Mass. 2014).
190. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing government data showing
pleas account for ninety-five percent of criminal convictions); Stephanos Bibas, Regulatingthe
Plea BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. Rjzv. 1117, 1138-39

(2011) (describing plea bargaining as the norm).
191. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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government witness, such as promises of favorable treatment in exchange for testimony. 91 2 Immigration benefits clearly fall within this
category. 9 3 When a federal prosecutor did not disclose to the defense that a DEA witness, who would otherwise have been
undocumented, received immigration benefits in exchange for testifying, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found: "Any competent
lawyer would have known that Rivera's special immigration treatment by the INS and the DEA was highly relevant impeachment
material." 194
The Department of Homeland Security has issued ambiguous
guidance about how much information about a U visa application
may be disclosed to defense counsel. 95 Even if DHS disclosed nothing, however, local law enforcement may disclose information they
hold. An informal survey of local prosecutors by the Stanford Immigrants' Rights Clinic found a range of opinions about how much of
a U visa application had to be disclosed under Brady. 9 6 There is a
strong argument that Brady covers immigration assistance in obtaining a visa along with requests for such assistance. But

192. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). State court decisions and court rules
have echoed or extended this rule. See, e.g., People v. Westmoreland, 58 Cal.App.3d 32, 43
(Cal. 1976) (material that must be turned over includes "any inducements made to prosecution witnesses for favorable testimony."); Mazzan v. Warden, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (Nev. 2000)
("Evidence must also be disclosed if it provides grounds for the defense ...

to impeach the

credibility of the state's witnesses.").
193. See Sealy, 6 N.E.3d 1052. Cf U.S. v. Bin Laden, 397 F. Supp. 2d 465, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (quid pro quo exchange of immigration benefits for testimony could be valid for impeachment). See aLo State v. Jordan, 44 A.3d. 794, 815 (Conn. 2012).
194. United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 392 (9th Cir 2004).
195. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMPILEMENrATION OF SECI'ION 1367 INFORMAtION PROVISIONS, INSTRUCION NUMBER 002-02-001 (2013). The policy states that "the entire" alien file of
a U visa applicant is not discoverable to defense counsel in state criminal cases. Id. at 7.

Elsewhere, the policy states:
In addition to the enumerated statutory exceptions [to confidentiality of files], there
may be instances in which disclosure of protected information is mandated by court
order or constitutional requirements. For example, disclosure may be required in a
federal, state, or local criminal proceeding for purposes of complying with constitu-

tional obligations to provide exculpatory and impeachment material that is relevant
either to guilt or punishment of a criminal defendant in a federal criminal proceeding
("Brady" material) or that bears upon the credibility of a prosecution witness ("Giglio"
material). If DOI or a state or local prosecutor requests protected information that is
not subject to disclosure under one of the statutory exceptions and that will be disclosed to a court or another agency (other than DOS), please consult DHS counsel.

Id. at 8.
196. See STANFORD

LEGAL CI.INIC AND BAY AREA LEcGAL AID, UNDERSTANDING AND RESPOND-

ING TO SUBPOENPUS: A GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION A-irORNEYS RFPRESENTING U-VISA APPLICANTS

(May 2010).
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prosecutors might not be obligated to reveal other aspects of a witness's immigration status. 19 7 Yet aggressive defense attorneys may be
able to subpoena the immigrant witness directly, adding considerable stress for victims even if the case does not go to trial. The
Stanford Clinic reports this cautionary tale:
[I]n one recent case in Northern California, defense counsel
subpoenaed a nonprofit immigration attorney's copy of a client's complete U-visa application. The immigration lawyer
filed a motion to quash, which the judge denied. The judge
then conducted an in camera review of the documents. After
reviewing the documents, the judge released a majority of the
contents of the U-visa application to the defense. This information was subsequently used to impeach the victim's
credibility on the stand, and to request further records from
the victim's sexual assault counselors. The immigration lawyer
was also required to testify about the timing of the client's request for U-visa assistance. 9
The prospect of a hostile defendant issuing a subpoena to probe
a victim's immigration background potentially increases immigrants' fear of going to the police to begin with. Likewise, if
prosecutors perceive that providing U visa certifications will damage the credibility of otherwise believable victim-witnesses, they may
become more reluctant to provide such assistance. If it is foreseeable that defense lawyers will scrutinize a victim's immigration
situation, it may appear better for the prosecution if the victim has
not received any tangible benefits in exchange for her cooperation.
Thus, the structure of the U visa program potentially undermines
the program's own noble goals.
Any immigration benefit granted in exchange for claiming status
as a victim could be material for impeachment. 199 But the structure
of the U visa enhances this problem by requiring victims to assist
police and prosecutors, making victims dependent on law enforcement to certify their visa applications. Additionally, the U visa
certification process could cause difficulties in cases where a victimwitness recants and becomes a witness for the defense, since police
and prosecutor may have cause to withdraw their certification. 200
197. See People v. Walls, 752 N.E.2d 456 (IIl. 2001) (general information about a witness's
immigration file not covered by Brady).
198. STANFORD LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 196, at 2.
199. See discussion, sura, at Part V.B.
200. Cf United States v. Juan, 704 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (prosecution interference
with former accusers who turned into defense witnesses, including threats of perjury charges,
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The law enforcement certification procedure also means that local
prosecutors will have actual or constructive possession of the impeachment material, which makes it harder for prosecutors to avoid
disclosure under Brady.20 1 But for the certification process, police
and prosecutors would not have direct access to a witness' immigration status and could honestly state that they had provided no
immigration benefits to the witness.

VI.

ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR FIXING

THE U VISA'S BUILT-IN PROBLEMS

A. The Fourth Amendment Model
Forcing victims to become accusers creates problems within the
U visa program. The entangling of victimization and accusation
stems from Congress' dual desire to extend protection to immigrant victims while also aiding law enforcement. In addition, the
regulations implementing the U visa program rely on law enforcement to certify genuine victims, which creates difficulties for both
victim applicants and the people they accuse. There is a danger that
preconceived notions about what a genuine victim looks like, coupled with a desire to rescue female victims, will prejudice the
criminal justice system against immigrant men. On the flip side, the
U visa potentially damages the credibility of women who honestly
report domestic violence, subjecting them to harsh cross-examinaion. Thus, in the prototypical domestic violence context of a
woman accusing a man, the U visa paradoxically hurts both the victim and the accused. More concretely, the U visa may increase both
the risk of wrongful convictions and courts' reluctance to believe
victims.
For now, the most visible problem with the U visa is its limited
quota and the growing waiting list. These structural problems with
the U visa are likely to grow over time, as awareness of the program
spreads and issuing U visas becomes a routine part of local law enforcement and criminal law practice. In recognizing these
challenges, it is essential to not lose sight of the urgent reasons why
may violate the right to a fair trial). See atso Ruth A. Moyer, Substantial Government Interference
with Prosecution Witnesses: The Ninth Circuits Decision in United States v. Juan, 98 MINN. L. REv.
22, 28-29 (2013) (discussing the implications of the Juan decision including its potential to
heighten defendants' rights under the Confrontation Clause).
201. Brady applies when exculpatory material is within the actual or constructive possession of officials acting for the state. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004).
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the U visa was created. Proper reform efforts should aim to refine
the U visa program by minimizing unintended consequences.
Policymakers created the U visa program to address a basic problem

of equality. 21 2

Unauthorized

immigrants

were

severely

disadvantaged relative to citizens and legal residents in their ability
to access law enforcement assistance. To effectively solve this problem, the U visa program should have equalized the positions of
unauthorized immigrants and citizens. Instead, U visa made unauthorized immigrants unequal in a new way. The program created
an incentive for unauthorized immigrants to accuse others of
crimes, an incentive that citizens and legal residents do not have.
How might this be improved?
Before suggesting any solution, it is important to note that immigration status will never become completely irrelevant, nor will all
motives for false testimony ever disappear. A witness will always face
pressure to stick to the original story he or she gave to police, both
to save face and to avoid prosecution. 20 An immigrant who claims
to have been a victim of crime in an immigration application and
then outright retracts that claim in later testimony could be prosecuted for pejury.20 4 But the same may be said of a citizen who
makes an allegation of domestic violence while going through a difficult divorce. Any number of things, ranging from personal animus
to potential immigration benefits, could influence a witness' testimony about an alleged crime. It would be unrealistic to attempt to
eliminate all ulterior motives or potential for perjury. Instead, improvements to the U visa program should focus on minimizing
unnecessary influence as much as possible, such that immigrants'
credibility is not subject to deeper scrutiny than that of other
witnesses.
One approach may be to disentangle immigration enforcement
from routine law enforcement's targeting of common crime. After
all, local law enforcement demonstrates a growing reluctance to cooperate with federal immigration authorities, especially by refusing
to detain people at the request of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 20 5 But this alone is unlikely to address fully the
apprehensions of unauthorized immigrants. Anyone who has their
fingerprints checked against the national FBI database may have
202.

See discussion sufrra, at Part II.

203. I am indebted for this insight to Prof. GabrielJ. Chin. Personal Communication with
Prof. Gabriel J. Chin to author (October 13, 2014).
204.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2012).

205. See, e.g.,Julia Preston, Sheriffs Limit Detention oflmmigrants, N.Y. TIMFS, April 18, 2014,
at AI 1(L).
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their data forwarded to DHS for immigration checks. 206 Thus, a
crime victim seeking police assistance can reasonably anticipate
that his or her immigration status will be brought to the attention
of federal authorities. This danger is heightened if local law enforcement officials actively pursue unauthorized immigrants and
are likely to alert DHS. But this danger exists even when police run
fingerprints merely as a routine part of investigating a crime and
are not interested in immigration enforcement.
Orde Kittrie suggested protecting immigrant crime victims by enacting a special rule of evidence that prohibits immigration
authorities from using any evidence they learned from a person
having come forward to report a crime during deportation proceedings. 20 7 In essence, Kittrie suggested creating a new
exclusionary rule of evidence for immigration cases in immigration
court, similar to the rule that excludes evidence in criminal cases
that was obtained through an illegal search. 218 On its own, this may
be too narrow to be useful in many cases. DHS may not need any
evidence from recent police contact in order to prove removability. 20 9 However, Kittrie's model could be expanded analogously to
the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, with application
of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. This doctrine extends
the exclusionary rule to evidence that is derived from the initial
constitutional violation; the government may use the evidence only
if it would have been obtained independently. 210 Another evidentiary exclusion that may be useful would be to prohibit using a
witness' statements in a criminal trial to impeach his or her assertions in an immigration application. This would leave an immigrant
witness free to tell the truth on the stand in a criminal case, without
fear that truthful testimony might be used to undermine his or her
2 11
chance at a visa.
Exclusionary rules would force immigration enforcement to operate entirely separate from regular law enforcement. Imagine that
a person overstayed a visa or entered without inspection several
years ago and now reports a crime to police. Today, if this person
tells police that she is an unauthorized immigrant, this statement
206.

See Aarti Kohli, et al., Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of

Demographics and Due Process 1 (2011) avaiable at https://www.law.berkely.edu/file/Secure_
Communities by-theNumber.pdf

207. Kittrie, supra note 166, at 1503.
208. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding "that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . [i]nadmissible in a state court.").
209. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (grounds of removeability).
210. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, 6 SE~ci & SEIZURE § 11.4 (5"nIi in.) (Dec. 2013).
211. This idea was suggested by Prof. Chin. Personal Communication, supra note 203.
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might be excluded from use in Immigration Court. But now that
immigration authorities are aware of her presence, they could
prove by other means that she is present in violation of the law,
perhaps by showing evidence that her visa expired. This would
make her deportable. 21 2 But the expanded exclusionary rule would
bar DHS from initiating removal proceedings against a person unless he or she would have come to the attention of DHS despite his
or contact with police for unrelated criminal matters.
Kittrie's proposal is intriguing because it attempts to equalize the
standing of unauthorized immigrant crime victims without providing any immigration benefits. Instead, the proposal creates a
firewall between routine law enforcement and immigration enforcement. In the abstract, it may have considerable potential, but
it will likely encounter political and practical obstacles as well. First,
recent decades reflect a trend of marrying immigration control and
crime control. 2 13 Second, this approach would eliminate an immigration benefit that currently exists, and thus would likely attract
opposition from immigrant advocates who want to create more opportunities for millions of unauthorized immigrants in the country
to normalize their status.

B. The Asylum Model

The U visa program could also be improved by separating the
role of victim from the role of accuser. At the outset, it should be
clear that the victim and the accuser are the same person. But
policymakers could separate the roles to a significant degree. This
would ideally allow victims to feel confident enough to help law
enforcement bring perpetrators to justice. But for most people, doing one thing does not necessitate doing the other. If a person were
severely injured in an assault and robbery, he would need medical
treatment and perhaps trauma therapy. He also might tell police
who attacked him, but this is a different role. Seeking medical care
for injuries does not entangle the rights of any third party, but accusing another person of a violent felony does.
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).
213. See generallyJennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Con-

trol and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007) (exploring the history of the blurred
boundaries between immigration control, crime control and national security); Jennifer M.
Chac6n, OvercriminalizingImmigration, 102J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOcGY 613 (2012) (tracing the
major developments in immigration law and enforcement that have increased the criminalization of immigration).
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Our immigration system already has considerable experience operating a victim-based visa system that keeps the role of the victim
separate from the role of accuser. The asylum system grants visas
and potential permanent residency and citizenship on the basis of a
well-founded fear of persecution in a foreign country.2 1 4 Three related immigration benefits may be relevant in a case where an
immigrant fears returning to his or her country of origin: asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
against Torture. 21 5 Each has its own legal criteria and differs in the
benefits awarded. 21 6 But for present purposes, what matters is their
common focus on people who are victims of human rights abuses
abroad. For ease of discussion, I will group all of these under the
rubric "asylum" because of this common element, even though
these categories operate differently in other respects.
To state a claim for asylum, a victim must explain why he or she is
in danger of a serious human rights violation. 21 7 Applicants must
cite either direct violations by agents of a foreign government or
others' failure to stop such violations. 21 8 Thus, asylum-seekers must
make claims that accuse a foreign government of potentially criminal activity. Asylum applicants' claims may be problematic outside
the immigration context. The statements made by asylum-seekers to
support their asylum applications could be evidence in a war crimes
trial, in an alien tort claims action, or in a case for sanctions. More
commonly, such accusations of human rights violations could fuel
diplomatic tension or media scrutiny.
In comparison, the potential impact of a victim's accusation appears more immediate in the case of a U visa, where a victim
typically accuses a person who is in close proximity, under the same
legal jurisdiction, and subject to immediate arrest and prosecution.
By contrast, it is unlikely that a human rights abuser in a far off
place will face formal legal action. And yet, international refugee
law historically struggled to separate the roles of victim and accuser
because of the potential diplomatic tensions that can result from
asylum claims. Governments worried that granting asylum would
appear to validate the asylum-seeker's allegations against another
country. Prominent agreements on asylum in Africa and Latin
See generally ANKER, supr note 7, at § 1:6.
215. See generaUy id. at §§ 1:8-1:9. I am not discussing Temporary Protected Status, which
is discretionary for the Secretary of Homeland Security and is not necessarily predicated on
human rights violations.
216. Id.
217. See id. at § 4:3.
218. See id. at §§ 4, 7.
214.
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America specify that granting asylum is "a peaceful and humanitarian act," not "an unfriendly act" toward another government.2 9
Such concerns played a significant role in the development of
the American asylum system. During the heart of the Cold War,
American asylum policy was explicitly tied to U.S. ideological and
strategic interests. As Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan wrote in a
history of early U.S. asylum policy, "A clear 'double standard' which
governed the acceptability of migrants from particular countries
2
emerged as the principal feature of American refugee policy."2 0
This was epitomized by how the U.S. treated Cubans fleeing from
the Castro regime differently than it treated Haitians fleeing a government allied with the U.S.221 In 1965, Congress enshrined this
ideological and anti-Communist bias in statute, guaranteeing a cer-

tain number of visas to people who fled "from any Communist or

222
Communist-dominated country or area."

In 1980, Congress changed course by enacting a new asylum law,
founded on the international treaty-based refugee definition, so
that fleeing from Communism was no longer a requirement for asylum in the United States. 22-3 Nevertheless, the strategic, diplomatic,
and ideological influence remained an explicit part of the system
for considerably longer, especially when people sought asylum from
governments allied with the United States. In the 1990 Supreme
Court case of INS v. Doherty, the Attorney General argued that foreign policy concerns were legitimate grounds for denying asylum
claims.

224

A divided Supreme Court resolved the case on other

225

grounds.
The question of whether asylum decisions can be dictated by foreign policy carried considerable urgency in the 1980s. During the
civil wars in Central America, asylum-seekers fled governments and
militia that, in many cases, were allied with and actively supported
219. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, art. III (4), Nov. 22, 1984, available at http://
www.oas.org/dil/1984-cartagena-declarations on-refugess.pdf ("To confirm the peaceful,
non-political and exclusively humanitarian nature of grant of asylum or recognition of the
status of refugee and to underline the importance of the internationally accepted principle
that nothing in either shall be interpreted as an unfriendly act towards the country of origin
of refugees."); Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art.
11(2), Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, ("The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and
humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State.").
220. Gi. LOESCHER &JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULArED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S
HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 69 (1986).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 73.
223. Id. at 213-214.
224. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Policy, Asylum and Discretion,28 WiLAMETrE L. REV. 751 (1992).
225.

Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322 (1990).
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by the United States. At that time, asylum adjudicators looked to
State Department advisory opinions. These opinions accounted for
foreign policy considerations and minimized the scale of human
rights violations by U.S. allies. 226 Until 1990, asylum adjudicators
had limited access to independent evidence of country conditions. 227 In many cases, State Department desk officers, who were
directly responsible for U.S. relations with the country at issue, conducted the decisive assessment of asylum cases. 228 To illustrate the
impact of this system, in 1989 the U.S. granted ninety-one percent
of asylum claims from the Soviet Union, and just two percent of
229
claims from El Salvador.
Foreign policy considerations can swing both ways in asylum
cases. As the statistics comparing the Soviet Union and El Salvador
illustrate, some asylum-seekers benefitted. Under this system, some
dubious Soviet asylum claims succeeded while the United States
failed to take special responsibility for asylum-seekers who were vic230
tims of American foreign policy.
A class action lawsuit, American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh
(commonly called the "ABC settlement"), brought in 1990 by Salva23
doran and Guatemalan asylum applicants, addressed these issues. '
The ABC settlement coincided with sweeping new asylum regulations promulgated in 1990. Reversing the position that the
government had taken just a few months earlier in Doherty, the government now conceded that:
[F]oreign policy and border enforcement considerations
are not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant
for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution;
[T]he fact that an individual is from a country whose government the United States supports or with which it has
226.

See Maureen O'Connor Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present, and Future, 26 NEw

ENG. L. REv. 995, 997 (1992).
227. Id, at 1033-1034.
228. LAwYFios COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE IMPL.MENTATION OF THE REFUGEE Acir OF
1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 33-34 (1990); see also Richard K. Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International
Obligations? 45 Mn. L. Rv. 91, 117 (1986).
229. Hurley, supra note 226, at 1032 n.351.
230.

See, e.g., MAIA CRISTINA GARCIA, SEEKING REFUGE: CENTIRA1. AMERICAN MIGRxION TO
92 (2006) (arguing that the U.S. had an obligation

MEXICO, THE UNITED STArES, AND CANADA

to Central American refugees because of its role fomenting conflict in their countries of
origin). Compare Eleanor E. Downes, Fulfilling the Promise?: When HumanitarianObligations and
Foreign Policy Goals Conflict in the United States, 27 B.C. TirD WORLD L.J. 477 (2007) (arguing

that human rights concerns should drive asylum policy, independent of foreign policy).
231. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (approving settlement agreement) [hereinafter ABC].
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favorable relations is not relevant to the determination of
whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of
persecution;
[W]hether or not the United States Government agrees
with the political or ideological beliefs of the individual is not
applicant for asyrelevant to the determination of whether an232
lum has a well-founded fear of persecution.
Under the new system, the government created a new corps of
Asylum Officers, with specialized training, separate from the INS
officers who handled other kinds of immigration cases.233 Adjudica-

tions relied on both governmental and non-governmental sources
to document human rights conditions. 23 4 Although some concern
remains that the State Department human rights reports have disproportionate weight with some adjudicators, the State Department
is no longer playing the decisive role in deciding asylum cases that
it did pre-1990.

235

Importantly, the 1990 asylum reforms went beyond statements of
principle. They enacted bureaucratic changes that implemented
the principle. Since asylum needed to be independent of both immigration enforcement and foreign policy considerations, it made
sense to create an independent government unit devoted to it and
to remove the government's foreign policy department from the
process. Unlike in the previous system, the State Department no
longer routinely opines on the merits of an individual asylum claim.
Instead, adjudicators consider the State Department's published
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices along with other
23 6
evidence.
The U visa system today is loosely analogous to the pre-1990 asylum system. The law enforcement certification process plays a
similar role to the State Department opinions, bureaucratically permitting an agency with interests in law enforcement and
prosecution to decide whether a victim should receive a form of
protection. As a result, victims are under pressure to conform their
testimony to the inclinations of law enforcement. The likelihood of
232.
233.

Id. at 799.
See Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum Adjudication in the United Stales, 6 GEo. IMMIC.R.

253, 274-276 (1992).
L:].
234.

See ANKER, supra note 7, at §3:12 n.5.

235. See Daniel L. Swanwick, Foreign Policy and Humanitarianism in U.S. Asylum Adjudication: Revisiting the Debate in the Wake of the War on Terror,21 GFo. IMMIGR. LJ. 129, 147 (2006)
("[T]oday's asylum adjudication biases are relatively subtle when compared with those observed during the Cold War."); see also Ai'uc'R, supra note 7, at §3:12 n.5.
236. ANKER, supra note 7, at § 3:12 n.5.
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receiving benefits depends on the specific orientations of the police
agency in the jurisdiction. In this system, the roles of victim and
accuser cannot be separated.
Using the 1990 asylum reforms as a model, reforming the U visa
program's bureaucratic administration could head off looming
problems with the program. This requires a partly statutory change
so that the U visa no longer formally requires crime victims to assist
police; other reforms, however, could be regulatory. In order to
eliminate law enforcement agencies' certification of crimes, a
Crime Victims Unit, modeled loosely on the Asylum Office, could
be created within the Citizenship and Immigration Office.
Much as the Asylum Office does for asylum applications, the
Crime Victims Unit would adjudicate applications for U visas. Because law enforcement would no longer certify, applications, this
new unit would have to scrutinize applications more seriously than
USCIS currently does. The burden to assess whether the applicant
is in fact a genuine victim of a qualifying crime would shift back to
the federal government. Making such assessments is not easy, but it
is also not a new challenge for USCIS. Assessing whether the applicant faces a genuine danger of persecution is a central part of
asylum adjudication. 237 Assessing an applicant's credibility is a critical part of this inquiry. 23 8 It may actually be somewhat easier to
make these assessments in U visa cases than in asylum cases. Because asylum cases concern persecution in other countries, there is
often little probative evidence available other than the applicant's
own statements. 23 9 Because U visas concern crime in the United
States, more reliable documentation and evidence might be available. Nonetheless, the new USCIS unit would need to conduct
significant inquiry into cases, including in depth interviews with applicants, much as the Asylum Office does routinely. 240
One immediate benefit of this system is that it would be centralized and national, so that only the federal government would make
immigration decisions. Immigrant victims of crime would not be
subject to inconsistent implementation by local governments. 241 Significantly, law enforcement agencies responsible for combatting
237.

See ANKER, supra note 7, at § 2:3.
238. See Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in
Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 369 (2003); ANK1R, supra note 7, at

§§ 3:19-3:27.
239.

See id. at 368-374.

240. See8 C.F.R. § 1208.9 (2012) (describing procedures for an interview with an asylum
officer).
241. Cf Srikantiah, supra note 117, at 207 (proposing centralized federal decision making
on T visas for similar reasons).
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common crime-in most cases, local police and prosecutorswould no longer be in a position to provide any immigration benefits to victims. Police reports and other law enforcement documents
would likely be central parts of U visa applications. For this reason,
a defendant could still argue that the immigrant reported a crime
in hopes of getting a visa. But this argument would be significantly
weakened because the victim would no longer be required by law to
help local police. Instead, an immigrant who obtains a U visa
through USCIS would be put in a position similar that of a citizen
in deciding whether to assist police and prosecutors. This would
thus achieve the primary goal that the U visa was established to
pursue.
However, significant problems arise with reforming the U visa
program to parallel the asylum system. First, Congress deliberately
required cooperation with law enforcement in both the U and T
visas, and they may not want to eliminate this requirement. But
Congress need not surrender the policy goal of assisting law enforcement entirely. Instead, Congress should be concerned, first,
that crime victims are secure enough to come forward, and second,
that victims' testimony will not be tainted because of immigration
incentives. Prosecutions will be stronger if witnesses can testify without the defense impeaching the victim's credibility by raising
potential immigration benefit.
Because there would no longer be a quid pro quo exchange of
testimony for immigration benefits, prosecutors and victims would
be in a better position to resist subpoenas and Brady demands. As
we have seen, state courts are sometimes reluctant to allow unfettered scrutiny of witnesses' immigration status, since this is not
inherently relevant to most criminal cases. Moreover, in terms of
Brady, state prosecutors would in fact have relatively little to disclose
since local law enforcement would no longer be certifying U visa
applications. It may still come to light that a victim asked about or
sought a U visa. But prosecutors would be better able to resuscitate
the victim's credibility by asking if the immigration benefit required
a victim to testify for the prosecution. The honest answer would be
no.
Second, this proposal would be expensive. By relying on local law
enforcement to certify applications, the federal government effectively deflected an administrative burden assigned to it by
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Congress. 242 USCIS, which adjudicates U visas at its Vermont Service Center, already shoulders much of this burden. 243 But there
would be real costs in terms of hiring staff, training skilled adjudicators, and establishing the necessary offices* and administrative
support. Today, USCIS typically adjudicates these applications on
the basis of paper applications alone. 244 Without the local law enforcement certification, individual interviews would likely be
necessary, along with a more thorough review of evidence that the
person is a genuine victim. This would entail a much greater administrative and adjudicatory burden.
When the new Asylum Corps was established after the ABC settlement, the government hired eighty-two new asylum officers in 1991
and another sixty-eight in 1992.245 It established seven regional asylum offices around the country based on an expectation of needing
to adjudicate 80,000 applications per year. 246 By 2007, the Asylum
Office was actually handling 25,700 applications per year, but its
24 7
staffing had grown to include 291 asylum officers and supervisors.
As demonstrated in Part V.A, there is good reason to expect a comparable number of U visa applications. The Asylum Office
therefore provides a helpful model, which could be used to estimate the potential administrative burden of a new USCIS unit.
Third, this process would impose new burdens on U visa applicants. Requiring an intensive interview in every case will necessarily
make the application process far more stressful and intimidating
for applicants, which may undermine the purpose of encouraging
crime victims to seek assistance. It may also make the application
process more time consuming and expensive, so applicants might
need to pay much more money to secure competent legal assistance
with an application.
For these reasons, the asylum model may offer useful lessons illustrating an alternative approach to a victim-based visa program,
242. See8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15)(U)(i) (2012) (stating a U visa shall issue "if the Secretary
of Homeland Security determines that [eligibility criteria are met].").
243. See U.S. CITIZENSI IIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., 1-918, PET'ITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANI STATus, available at http://www.uscis.gov/i-918 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015).
244. See U.S. CrrZVNSII' & IMMIGRATION SERV., FORM 1-918 INS'CRUCI IONs at 8 (explaining
that after initial application, USCIS may ask for more evidence in writing, and may schedule

an interview, but is not required to do so).
245.

Beyer, supra note 233, at 275.

246.

See id. (summarizing the estimates used to establish the asylum offices).

247.

U.S. Gov't Accou irABI'IXY OFFIcPi, GAO-08-935, US ASYLUM

SYS

M: AGENCIES HAVE

TAKEN ACTIONS TO HELP ENSURE QUALrlY IN THE ASYLUM ADJUI)ICATION PROCESS, BUT CI-tAI_

LFNC.S REMAIN 18, 150 (2008); UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2007: Trends in Displacement,

Protection and Solutions 46 n.43 (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4981c37c2.html.
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but it may not perfectly fit the U visa context without additional
adaptations.

C. The Trafficking Victim Model
A hybrid approach may be loosely suggested by the system used
to administer the T visa for victims of trafficking. The T visa bears
substantial similarities to the U visa. To be eligible for a T visa, a
noncitizen must be a victim of a certain kind of crime and must be
willing to assist law enforcement. 248 However, Congress adopted
somewhat different language to define the law enforcement assistance requirement for the T visa. As we have seen, the U visa
requires that the victim "possesses information" about the crime
and vaguely demands that he or she be "helpful" to law enforcement.249 This leaves local police and prosecutors to decide what
they consider to be sufficiently helpful, particularly when combined
with the demand for a law enforcement certification. By contrast,
under the T visa, Congress required only that the victim "compl[y]
with any reasonable request for assistance" from law enforcement,
and provides for an exception when the victim "is unable to cooperate . .. due to physical or psychological trauma. " 250 Because the T
visa only requires victims to comply with requests from law enforcement, it is less of a problem if the police simply take little interest in
the case.
There are also important differences in the T visa's application
procedures. First, law enforcement certification, known in T visa
25 1
applications as an "endorsement," is preferred but not required.
Such an endorsement is certainly best for the applicant because USCIS will consider it "as primary evidence that the applicant has been
the victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons." 2 52 But if the
victim does not obtain an endorsement, "[ciredible secondary evidence and affidavits may be submitted to explain the nonexistence
or unavailability of the primary evidence and to otherwise establish
the requirement that the applicant be a victim of a severe form of
253
trafficking in persons."
248.

See8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(T)(i) (2012).

249. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(U)(i).
250.
251.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(15) (T) (i) (III).
8 C.F.R. § 214.11(f)(1) (2007) ("An LEA endorsement is not required.").

252. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(f)(2).
253. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(f)(3).
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Second, the T visa regulations provide that USCIS "may require
an applicant to participate in a personal interview."2

54

This allows a

T visa application to proceed on two alternative tracks. If a law enforcement endorsement is available, a T visa application simply
proceeds much like a U visa application. But it is also possible for
an applicant to circumvent the local law enforcement endorsement
and for USCIS to investigate further on its own. The personal interview component makes a T visa application similar to the asylum
process, which relies on in-depth, personal interviews of applicants
in nearly every case. 255 By contrast, the U visa regulations do not

provide for a personal interview and the statute requires law enforcement certification in all cases. 256 The T visa system thus allows

a victim to be somewhat less dependent on police and prosecutors
to secure a visa.
The T visa process may be a preferable model compared to the
asylum process. The U visa program could mimic the T visa program, making the personal interview optional for USCIS. This
would spare both the government and the applicant the burden of
conducting an interview in every case. Asylum applications typically
lack independent evidence of the violations that occurred abroad.
For this reason, the applicant's own testimony is central to the
case. 257 It makes sense to assume that the government needs to conduct an extensive personal interview in every case. But when crime
occurs in the United States, police reports, contemporaneous witness statements, and documentation are much more likely to be
available. As a result, it may not always be necessary to conduct a
personal interview to conclude that the applicant is a genuine victim. USCIS need only use this scarce resource in cases where it is
actually necessary.
The T visa model could be further improved in several other
ways. Although making the law enforcement endorsement optional
lessens the power law enforcement exerts over a witness, the endorsement is still a significant advantage. Thus, this program easily
creates grounds for impeachment. Questions like these, if answered
honestly, would still leave an unfavorable impression of an immigrant's victim's potential motivations:
254. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(d)(6) ("After the filing of an application forT nonimmigrant status, the Service may require an applicant to participate in a personal interview. The necessity
of an interview is to be determined solely by the Service.").
255.

See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., TiHE AFFIRMATIVE A-YLUM PROCESS, http://

www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylu m-process.
84
256. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14; 8 U.S.C. § 11 (p)(1) (2012).
257. See Kagan, supra note 238, at 368-371.
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" Isn't it true that the police/prosecutor is helping you avoid

deportation?
" Isn't it true that if they were not helping you, you would be
in greater danger of being deported, but instead you and
your children now have the chance to stay in this country?
" Isn't it true that if you did not agree to testify for the prosecution, they could decide to not help you with your
immigration problem?
" Isn't it true that if your testimony does not make the prosecutor happy, they could choose not to help you with
immigration?
" So, isn't it true that if you want to stay in this country, and if
you want your children to not be in danger of being deported, you need to say whatever it takes to keep the
prosecutor happy?
Even with the T visa structure, this is a valid line of cross-examination because the accurate answer to all of the questions is probably
yes.
This line of cross-examination could be muted significantly
through two changes to both the U visa program and the T visa
program. First, policyrnakers could eliminate the statutory requirements that victims must help the police. Immigrant victims' ability
to stay in the country would then no longer depend on keeping the
police and prosecutor happy. When citizens are victims of crime,
they are not normally under such pressure to cooperate with law
enforcement. By equalizing unauthorized immigrants' standing relative to other crime victims, they may be able to assist law
enforcement without undermining their credibility.
The second change would be to eliminate law enforcement endorsement or certification entirely. These endorsements set up a
quid pro quo between the immigrant victim and the police or prosecutor, which implies a motive to lie. Applicants for T and U visas
should submit police reports, witness statements, and criminal complaints with their visa applications. But pressuring victims to request
extra assistance from law enforcement adds little. It only creates the
impression that victims are trading testimony for immigration benefits. Without certification or endorsement, local police and
prosecutors would no longer provide victims direct help with immigration. The honest answers to the cross-examination questions
posed above would then be no instead of yes.
This proposal would not entirely eliminate the theoretical motivation to invent crime in order to obtain immigration benefits. It
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would reduce the motivation considerably and equalize the situations unauthorized immigrants, legal residents, and citizens face.
An immigrant might still make a fraudulent police report in order
to buttress an immigration application, but a similar potential motive exists for anyone who reports a theft to police and then files an
insurance claim for lost property. 258 This is less potent as impeachment material because there is no clear quid pro quo in which
benefits are exchanged for testimony. Moreover, the police do not
have continuing leverage over the victim. The potential motive to
fabricate is more easily counterbalanced by other checks, such as
the risk of prosecution for filing a false police report.259 Additionally, encouraging early police investigation facilitates
contemporaneous, neutral fact-gathering, which decreases the possibility that fraud will go undetected.

VII. CONCLUSION

The U visa is only a few years old, but it has already encountered
significant difficulties that seem likely to grow. The most obvious is
its limited quota, which is smaller than the number of immigrants
who could be reasonably expected to be victims of qualifying criminal offenses. Additionally, emerging problems with U visas suggest
that the program fails to put unauthorized immigrant victims in the
same position as other victims of crime. The U visa requires victims
to help police and prosecutors, giving law enforcement leverage
over immigrant victims. Defendants may impeach victims' credibility based on their immigration predicament, which in turn creates a
new reason for immigrants to fear helping law enforcement. It also
creates a new concern for law enforcement responding to immigrants claiming to be victims, who must wonder if they will
unwittingly give ammunition to aggressive defense attorneys when
they try to provide assistance to victims of crime. The structure of
the U visa thus undermines the objectives for which it was originally
created. Despite these problems, the U visa is essential. Without a
258. Insurance claims for theft typically require submitting police reports and other investigatory documents. See, e.g., How to Report a Homeowners Claim, STATE FARM, http://www
.statefarm.com/insurance/home-and-property/claims (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) ("If the
loss is caused by theft, notify the police."); Andrea Siedsma, What to expectfrom your insurance
company after a burglary, INSURE (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.insure.com/home-insurance/
after-a-burglary.html ('You will need to file a police report to get the ball rolling on a theft
claim.").
259. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.5 (West 2014) (stating that a person who reports to
police "that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed, knowing the report to be false, is

guilty of a misdemeanor.").
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program like this, unauthorized immigrants may be too afraid to
seek help from law enforcement, leaving a class of silent victims
who are deterred from contacting police.
To achieve its essential purpose, the U visa program should separate the role of victim from the role of accuser in a criminal case.
This shift would benefit criminal prosecutions by removing a defendant's opportunity to impeach the credibility of the victim. This
shift would also protect victims who, especially in cases of genderbased violence, are likely to face disbelief. The good news is that we
know how to run such a program.
The challenges that are built into the structure of the U visa
should offer a lesson about immigration programs generally. While
family ties and employment have been the primary avenues of
American immigration, the United States also has a number of immigration programs that benefit foreigners on the basis of their
victim status. These are noble programs, but they carry an inherent
problem. Most claims of victimhood include an inherent accusation
of wrongdoing by someone else. It is thus tempting for Congress to
merge the roles of victim and accuser, as it has done with the U visa
and to a slightly lesser extent with the T visa. But whenever this
happens, benefits offered to victims will begin to implicate the
rights of third parties or other vital interests, which over time may
undermine a well-intentioned effort to protect victims. Immigrants
should be able to seek protection as victims, and to levy accusations
against those who have done them harm. But it is a mistake to force
them to do both at the same time, or to make being an accuser a
condition for being recognized as a victim.

